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ABSTRACT 
 
Lindsay Brainard: The Scientific Power of Simulations:  
How Simulations Explain, Confirm, and Discover 
(Under the direction of Marc Lange) 
 
 
 My dissertation raises and answers questions about how the growing prevalence of 
computer simulations has changed the scientific method.  
One underdiscussed category of computer simulations are those used by researchers to 
reverse-engineer a phenomenon in order to learn something about the system from which the 
phenomenon arises in nature. Reverse-engineering simulations are employed when the physical 
details of a system under investigation cannot be directly observed by the researcher. In my 
account of how reverse-engineering simulations function, I identify five heuristics that specify 
reasonable indicators of their evidential value, and validate the heuristics by showing that they 
represent good scientific reasoning according to basic tenets of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. I 
present a case study of a simulation project from contemporary cognitive science in which 
scientists attempt to uncover the structure of human learning by designing computer programs 
featuring ideal adaptive agents. 
A growing number of computer simulations function to explain how something is possible. 
In discussing this category of simulations, I draw heavily upon a case study from ornithology in 
which a computer simulation succeeds in explaining how birds could possibly exhibit a given 
behavior without employing a certain mechanism. This case study not only provides an 
illustration of how computer simulations can give rise to how-possibly explanations, but also 
motivates a distinction between explaining how-possibly and merely demonstrating how-
iv 
 
possibly. I confront extant accounts of how-possibly explanations and identify ways in which 
they fall short of characterizing the explanatory achievement present in the case study. I then 
propose my own account of how-possibly explanations.  
Computer simulations are often especially well-suited to provide unifying explanations of 
scientific phenomena. I argue that other philosophers of science writing about explanatory 
unification have overlooked an important respect in which unification can occur. I call this 
modular unification. Modular unification occurs when scientists are able to appeal to a modest 
stock of functional ingredients operating in concert in order to explain disparate phenomena. To 
illustrate the unique explanatory value of modular unification, I appeal to a case study from 
behavioral psychology in which a computer simulation is introduced as a complement to fruitful 
empirical work.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Computer Simulations 
 
 Computer simulations are ubiquitous in contemporary science. In just the first ten weeks 
of 2017, Nature has already published fifteen research articles from Physics, Chemistry, and 
Biology in which computer simulations play a central role.1 Economists and other social 
scientists employ computer simulations to represent many complex dynamical systems of human 
interaction such as market economies and school choice programs.2,3 The 2013 Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry was awarded to three computational chemists (Martin Karplus, Michael Levitt, and 
Arieh Warshel) for their work in developing computer simulations of complex chemical 
systems.4 In his Nobel Lecture, Warshel predicted that “the enormous increase in computer 
power makes it virtually certain that computer simulations will increasingly become the key tool 
in modeling complex systems” (2013, p. 178). As these new technologies permeate scientific 
practice, the face of the scientific method is changing. Only by closely examining the various 
roles that computer simulations play in scientific practice can philosophers come to understand 
                                                 
1 Nature Archive (2017). 
 
2 Kirwin (2015). 
 
3 Tesfatsion (2008).  
 
4 Nobel Media (2014).  
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the fascinating new advances in our understanding of the natural world that are made possible by 
rapid increases in our computational power.  
 A computer simulation is a dynamic representation of some target system that is 
conducted via a computer program. This definition is a simplified version of the one presented 
by Eric Winsberg, who says that a simulation is “any system that is believed or hoped to to have 
dynamical behavior that is similar enough to some other system such that the former can be 
studied to learn about the latter,” and a computer simulation is just a simulation that is performed 
using a computer program (2009, p. 836). Among the common terms that scientists use to refer 
to computer simulations is “model.” I follow Patrick Grim et al. in avoiding the term “model” in 
this philosophical discussion of the value of computer simulations, because the term has been 
given various technical definitions in various corners of philosophy of science that I do not wish 
to take on board here (2013, p. 2370). The term “model” often appears in the discussions by 
scientists of the simulations that I cite in the three principal chapters of this thesis, and when it 
does, I will interpret this term in the same way I defined “computer simulation” above.  
 In light of the increasing reliance on computer simulations across the sciences, some 
philosophers of science have issued a call for rational reconstructions of the roles computer 
simulations play in scientific practice. Stephen Hartmann proposes that philosophers of science 
should investigate “why scientists use simulations, what function they have in the research 
process, and what their respective advantages and disadvantages are” (1996, p. 78). I agree with 
Hartmann that these are pressing and interesting questions worthy of philosophical investigation, 
and a central aim of this thesis is to make progress in answering them. 
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 A number of philosophers have taken steps toward developing an epistemology of 
computer simulations, employing a variety of different strategies to this end.5 Some have focused 
their attention on accounting for the function of particular computer simulations or particular 
scientific projects that employ simulations.6 Others haven taken a comparatively top-down 
approach in which they argue for broad claims about the role of computer simulations in science, 
often drawing conclusions they take to apply to all computer simulations.7  
 My methodology in this thesis is intermediate between these two approaches. In Chapters 
2, 3, and 4, I identify what I take to be three important scientific functions that computer 
simulations are naturally well-suited to perform. I then offer accounts of how these functions 
amount to good scientific reasoning. I devote a significant portion of each chapter to presenting 
an in-depth case study of a computer simulation in science that performs the function discussed 
in that chapter. While my investigations are firmly rooted in these case studies, my objective is to 
provide a rational reconstruction of each category of simulation that generalizes beyond the 
motivating cases to all computer simulations that share the specified function. By identifying 
three distinct functions performed by computer simulations, I show that computer simulations 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Barberousse, Franceschelli, and Imbert (2009); Beisbart (2012); El Skaf and Imbert (2013); 
Hartmann (1996); Grim, Rosenberger, Rosenfeld, Anderson, and Eason (2013); Humphreys (1990, 1995, 2004, 
2009); Krohs (2008); Laymon (1990); Morrison (2015); Parker (2009, 2010, 2014); Rohrlich (1990); and 
Winsberg (1999, 2003, 2009). 
 
6 For example, Parker has written extensively on the use of computer simulations in the study of weather and 
climate (2014).  
 
7 As one example of this top-down approach, El Skaf and Imbert argue that computer simulations share a basic 
function with thought experiments and field experiments that they call the “unfolding of scenarios” (2013). As 
another, Barberousse, Franceschelli, and Imbert argue that the epistemic value of computer simulations does not 
rely on their being conducted on physical machines (2009). A third example comes from Grim et al. who identify 
a tripartite structure that they take to be shared by all computer simulations: “The general pattern is one in which 
those operating the simulation posit a correspondence between some aspects of the simulation's structure and 
known aspects of reality, allowing them to read other aspects of this structure as corresponding to unknown 
aspects of reality” (2013, p. 2370-2371).  
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are too diverse in their scientific roles to be amenable to a unified treatment. So, instead of 
seeking a single, fully general account of the role simulations play in the scientific method, I 
make progress at understanding the epistemological value of computer simulations in science in 
a piecemeal fashion.  
 It is important for a rational reconstruction of scientific practice to avoid contradicting the 
claims made by scientists about their justification for their methods, at least for the most part. In 
the best cases, the rational reconstruction will be supported by at least some such claims. So, 
throughout this investigation, I examine what the scientists in each of the three case studies say 
about why they employ their computer simulations and show how these comments support my 
accounts of the value of these simulations. Because I aim not only to explain why these 
simulation practices are scientifically valuable, but also to describe accurately the practices and 
motivations of working scientists, my account of the scientific roles played by these simulations 
is answerable both to the demands of rigorous philosophical scrutiny and to the methods and 
claims of the scientists engaged in these simulation practices.  
 There are two preliminary clarifications to make at this point. First, many computer 
simulations are conducted exclusively for philosophically uninteresting pragmatic reasons. That 
is, they are conducted for reasons such as that they save time and money or avoid risking lives. 
Simulations of aircraft and spacecraft flight are typical examples of this kind of simulation.8 In 
these cases, a field experiment involving the real system (e.g. an actual flight test of a spacecraft 
prototype) would be preferable for data-gathering purposes, but it would be undesirable for a 
host of pragmatic reasons. In such a case, engineers employ computer simulations as useful 
                                                 
8 For example, NASA's Simulation Engineering Branch conducts an enormous number of computer simulations to 
aid in spacecraft development (Conner 2017).  
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resource-conserving tools, though they are still somewhat less valuable for research purposes 
than corresponding field experiments would be. While these simulations have been of great 
importance in many scientific research projects and technological advances, they do not to my 
knowledge raise any interesting philosophical puzzles beyond those raised by scientific models 
in general. In this thesis, I focus on simulations that have scientific value beyond these merely 
pragmatic advantages. The simulations of interest to me are not surrogates for actual field 
experiments; nor are they conducted primarily to save time, money, or other resources. Rather, 
they have an independent, non-pragmatic scientific value.  
 The second point of clarification is that none of the functions I describe in this thesis are 
in principle unachievable without computational resources. Roman Frigg and Julien Reiss have 
been critical of philosophers of science who describe computer simulations as presenting 
qualitatively new scientific puzzles. They argue that such claims are overblown, and write: 
The emphasis on novelty and the tendency to reason that the issues raised by 
simulations are completely unlike anything that philosophy of science has seen 
before prevents philosophers from appreciating what a discussion of simulations 
could contribute to ongoing debates. (2009, p. 595) 
 
I share their concerns on this point, and I wish to emphasize that the none of the functions of 
simulations I identify in this thesis are in principle off limits to scientists working without the aid 
of computers. To show this, I provide in each chapter at least one example of the same scientific 
function being achieved without a computer program. However, I also show that computers are 
especially well-suited to achieve each of these functions. Thus, as computer hardware and 
software becomes more advanced, these functions can be carried out by scientists with 
increasing ease. It is therefore not surprising that these functions are occupying an ever-greater 
portion of scientific research.  
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 Though these functions are in principle achievable without computers, computer 
simulations are necessary for some scientific research programs, given our present scientific and 
technological capabilities. This is because aspects of some target systems that scientists wish to 
represent are so complex that there are no other means available to achieve the desired 
representations. It is possible, however, that some technology other than computer programs 
could be developed in the future that would be able to represent these systems. So, the functions 
I identify in this thesis are not ones that only computers can perform in principle, even though 
computers are indispensable for achieving these functions in many contemporary research 
projects.  
 
1.2 Introduction to Principal Chapters 
 
 In each of the principal chapters of this thesis, my goal is to illustrate the scientific 
function played by a class of computer simulations and explain how these simulations can 
advance our epistemic position with regard to the systems they depict. I devote a significant 
portion of each chapter to discussing at least one specific computer simulation from 
contemporary scientific practice that I take to be a paradigm case of the category under 
consideration. To demonstrate the adequacy of my proposed accounts of how each kind of 
simulation functions, I apply each account to the corresponding case study from scientific 
practice.  
 In Chapter 2, I identify one underdiscussed category of computer simulations: those used 
by researchers to reverse-engineer a phenomenon in order to learn something about the system 
from which the phenomenon arises in nature. Reverse-engineering simulations are employed in 
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situations where the physical details of a system under investigation cannot be directly observed 
by the researcher. For instance, the fact that astrophysicists are not able to observe the Big Bang 
and the early evolution of the universe directly motivates the need for cosmological computer 
simulations.9 In my account of how reverse-engineering simulations function, I identify five 
heuristics that specify reasonable indicators of their evidential value, and validate the heuristics 
by showing that they represent good scientific reasoning according to basic tenets of Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory. To that end, I present a case study of a simulation project from 
contemporary cognitive science in which scientists attempt to uncover the structure of human 
learning by designing computer programs in which simple, ideal, adaptive agents attain mastery 
of a task through practice. Understanding this simulation project in terms of the account I 
develop in this chapter makes it clear why projects of this form are scientifically valuable and 
why the scientists who perform these simulations make many of the choices that they do.  
 In Chapter 3, I discuss a category of simulations that are devised to explain how some 
state of affairs is possible. In discussing this category of simulations, I draw heavily upon a case 
study from ornithology in which a computer simulation succeeds in explaining how birds could 
possibly form complex flock formations without a leader-bird. This case study not only provides 
an illustration of how computer simulations can give rise to how-possibly explanations, but also 
motivates a distinction between explaining how-possibly and merely demonstrating a possibility. 
In seeking an account of how-possibly explanations that respects this distinction, I confront 
extant accounts of how-possibly explanations and identify ways in which they fall short of 
characterizing the explanatory achievement present in the case study. I then propose my own 
account of how-possibly explanations. On the view I defend, how-possibly explanations in 
                                                 
9 For one such research program, see Project Illustris (Illustris Corporation 2015). 
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scientific practice succeed when they resolve a state of puzzlement by correcting for an 
imaginative frustration.  
 In Chapter 4, I consider a category of simulations that furnish a distinct kind of 
explanation of why some state of affairs actually obtains. These are simulations that are well-
suited to provide unifying explanations of scientific phenomena. I argue that other philosophers 
of science writing about explanatory unification have overlooked an important respect in which 
unification can occur. I call this form of unification modular unification. Modular unification 
occurs when scientists are able to appeal to a modest stock of functional ingredients operating in 
concert in order to explain disparate phenomena. To illustrate the distinct explanatory value of 
modular unification, I appeal to a case study from behavioral psychology in which a computer 
simulation is introduced as a complement to fruitful empirical work. I argue that the most natural 
way to understand the simulation's role in the research project is in terms of the explanatory 
power contributed by its modular unification. Finally, I explain why computer simulations are so 
apt to furnish modular unification explanations. Because programming is typically modular, 
computer simulations are uniquely capable of revealing interactions among modules in complex 
systems that scientists could not discover without computational aid.  
 In at least one interesting respect, the three categories of simulation that I identify play a 
similar role in advancing the epistemic positions of the scientists who employ them. They all 
make use of the representational power of digital computation to extend scientists' a priori 
reasoning beyond their human cognitive limitations. Throughout this thesis, I explore the 
implications of this unique value of computer simulations for an adequate conception of the 
scientific method in the digital age.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVERSE-ENGINEERING SIMULATIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Scientists use some computer simulations to reverse engineer the systems they are 
studying. In other words, the purpose of these computer simulations is to replicate a given 
system's behavior and thereby suggest hypotheses about how the system works. For instance, a 
flourishing research program in astrophysics is the attempt to study cosmic evolution by 
employing computer programs to reverse engineer systems that match observed features of 
galaxies.10 Systems biologists seek to reverse engineer gene regulatory networks to determine 
how transcription information is processed by these systems.11 A major research program in 
cognitive neuroscience is the simulation of human learning by reverse engineering a system with 
the same learning curve shape and rate of progress as actual human learning.12 In each of these 
projects, computer programs are used to represent complex systems digitally. In this chapter, my 
goal is to illustrate the scientific role played by this class of computer simulations and to explain 
how they can advance our epistemic position with regard to the physical systems they depict. 
                                                 
10 Project Illustris describes its central research aim as follows: “To test our current ideas on the formation and 
evolution of galaxies, we strive to create simulated galaxies as detailed and realistic as possible, and compare 
them to galaxies observed in the real universe. By probing our successes and failures, we can further enhance our 
understanding of the galaxy formation process, and thereby perhaps realize something fundamental about the 
world in which we live” (http://www.illustris-project.org/about/#public-one). 
 
11 See, for instance, Mangan et al 2003 and a philosophical discussion of this practice in Green 2015.  
 
12 See, for instance, Ohlsson and Jewett 1995, Ohlsson and Jewett 1997, and Ohlsson 2011. 
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Once I have offered my account of how reverse-engineering simulations can be valuable in 
scientific practice, I will apply my account to the aforementioned computer simulation of human 
learning in cognitive science. My account explains why such simulations are promising as a way 
of gleaning evidence about the nature of human learning. 
 These sophisticated attempts at reverse-engineering are made possible by the ease with 
which complex systems can be represented – and their representations manipulated – in 
computer programs. This likely explains the growing number of reverse-engineering simulations 
in the sciences. However, reverse engineering a system to learn more about it is actually quite a 
familiar way of coming to understand a system, and it can be a valuable research tool even when 
the simulations are relatively simple. In order to illustrate my account of the evidential weight of 
reverse-engineering simulations, it will be useful to rely on some simple examples of reverse-
engineering practices that do not involve computers at all.  
 I will introduce two toy examples that both involve attempts to reverse engineer systems 
in order to gain evidence about them, but that differ enormously in their evidential power. By 
contrasting these two examples, I hope to understand why the success of some reverse-
engineering simulations in reproducing their target behaviors provides better evidence about their 
target systems than the success of others. In one toy case, it seems that the investigator has 
gained quite a bit of evidence about the system being investigated as a result of the reverse-
engineering process. In the other, it seems that the investigator has gained only a small amount of 
evidence about the way the system under investigation works. It is not immediately obvious why 
there is a disparity, but in providing my account of the evidential import of reverse-engineering 
simulations, I will explain why one of these simulations is more evidentially powerful than the 
other.  
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 I describe the two cases in section 2. In section 3, I develop my account of reverse-
engineering simulations, in which I identify five heuristics for assessing their evidential value. 
After I introduce each heuristic, I provide an account of why, within Bayesian confirmation 
theory, employing this heuristic amounts to good scientific practice. In section 4, I offer a case 
study of a reverse-engineering simulation practice from contemporary cognitive science, and in 
section 5, I offer an analysis of that case study in terms of my account. I conclude by showing 
how the evidential value of a reverse-engineering simulation depends both on features of the 
hypothesis that researchers extract from the simulation (which include, for instance, the level of 
description at which the hypothesis characterizes the system) and on the background knowledge 
of the researchers. Importantly, my account will illustrate how the very same considerations 
apply to the hypothesis-generation functions and the confirmatory functions of reverse-
engineering simulations.  
 First, it will be necessary to clarify my use of some key terms. I will use the term reverse 
engineering to refer to the practice of building a system (a reverse-engineered system) to 
simulate some behavior observed in a system of scientific interest (a target system) with the 
intention of discovering something about the target system. The target system will typically be a 
physical system with aspects that the investigator is unable to investigate by direct observation, 
such as an unknown internal mechanism, so that the investigator's best option is to try reverse 
engineering the system. When I say that a case of reverse engineering is “successful,” I mean 
that the reverse-engineered system exhibits the behavior of the target system that the investigator 
set out to replicate. 
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2. Motivating Cases 
 
 I will now present two simple cases of reverse engineering. I will use these cases to 
motivate my account of the evidential value of reverse-engineering simulations, which I present 
in section 3. Although the following two cases are simple, my account will also apply to more 
complicated, realistic cases of reverse-engineering computer simulations, as I will demonstrate in 
sections 4 and 5. 
  
 2.1 Sara and the Mystery Beer 
 
 While visiting a faraway friend who enjoys home-brewing, Sara is served a glass of the 
most interesting and delicious beer she has ever tasted. She asks her friend how it is made, and 
he declines to comment, claiming that the recipe is a family secret. He refuses to answer any 
questions Sara has about the ingredients used in brewing the beer or the brewing process. 
Enamored of the beer's taste, and saddened by how rarely she is able to visit this friend and enjoy 
sampling it, she decides to try to replicate the beer herself. She starts by reflecting on the taste of 
the beer. While she can't quite place it, she has some general ideas about the flavor profile that 
guide her in her selection of hops and other ingredients that she thinks might be involved. She 
assembles as many ingredients as possible, and begins working through combinations of them. 
She also does extensive research on the ways different beers are made and invests in a great deal 
of home-brewing equipment. She then undertakes a long process of attempting to reverse 
engineer the mysterious beer.  
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 Now, imagine that Sara's friend has given her some of the original beer to take home with 
her. She sets as her standard of success that she and a panel of beer aficionados are unable to 
distinguish a beer she has made from the original beer in a suitably long series of blind trials. 
After years of trying, Sara finally brews a beer that meets this standard of success. She notes 
with pleasure that, although she only reverse engineered the beer with the intention of replicating 
the taste of the initial beer, her reverse-engineered beer is indistinguishable in color from the 
original beer. She concludes that, in successfully reverse engineering the beer, she has acquired 
significant evidence about the original beer's recipe.  
  
 2.2 Jay and the Mystery Cube 
 
 Jay stumbles upon a mysterious cube while hiking in a remote area. The origin of the 
cube is a mystery, as are many of its other basic properties.13 All of his efforts to puncture its 
surface to examine its internal structure fail. The hard material that forms its seamless surface is 
not a substance Jay recognizes. He doesn't know who or what created the cube. The material out 
of which it is made is not familiar to him. He observes the cube repeatedly vibrating in a simple 
pattern. He doesn't know if the contents of the cube are solely responsible for the vibrating or if, 
perhaps, the cube is somehow responding to its environment. Moving the cube in all the ways he 
can think of does nothing to alter the vibration pattern.  
                                                 
13 The reader will naturally note that this case is highly contrived. Though it makes for an artificial example, this is 
deliberate. The unrealistic details about Jay's highly limited background knowledge are necessary to draw some 
stark contrasts with the background knowledge available to Sara in the mystery beer case. I explore the 
important role played by background knowledge in determining the evidential value of a reverse-engineering 
simulation in section 3.  
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 He brings the cube home to his workshop, and he decides that a reasonable way of 
proceeding is to attempt to mimic the vibrations in an externally similar cube of his own 
construction. He begins by charting the details of the vibrations and procuring an empty box of a 
similar size. Since he does not recognize the original cube's material, he chooses something that 
feels similarly hard to the touch, though it is still recognizably different. Through repeated trials 
with different physical details, Jay eventually fashions a mechanism to fit inside the box that is 
capable of producing the same vibration pattern that he observes in the original cube. His 
standard of success is that a vibrometer gives the same readings for the frequency and amplitude 
of the vibrations in both the mystery cube and the reverse-engineered box over a suitably long 
series of trials. Once he devises a mechanism that meets this standard, Jay concludes that he has 
acquired some evidence about what causes the mystery cube to vibrate in the ways he observes.  
 
3. The Evidential Value of Reverse Engineering 
 
 I take both of these cases to illustrate the fact that reverse engineering can be an appealing 
way to begin studying a system when other methods of proceeding are not viable. In both of 
these cases, a more direct way of finding out about the target system is not obviously available to 
the investigators. In the mystery beer case, Sara would certainly prefer to learn about the beer 
from either her friend's testimony about the process by which he brews the beer or by observing 
her friend while he is engaged in the brewing process. But her friend's refusal to share the family 
recipe makes these methods of learning about the beer unavailable to Sara. In the mystery cube 
case, Jay would simply break the surface of the cube to examine its internal structure if he could, 
but all of his efforts to do so fail. He lacks access to an X-ray scanner or any other device that 
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would enable him “see” the contents of the box, so he is left with no obvious means to observe 
the physical components of the system. In both cases, resorting to an attempt at reverse 
engineering the target system is a reasonable way of proceeding. 
 On my account, the very same scientific event – the completion of a successful reverse-
engineering simulation – is both an instance of hypothesis formation and an instance of 
hypothesis justification. This runs counter to the strict separation of the context of discovery and 
the context of justification that philosophers of science have traditionally accepted. On the 
traditional view of the distinction between these two contexts, the norms for evaluating 
hypotheses do not apply to the process of forming hypotheses (and many of the distinction's 
original proponents thought that there were no norms for discovery at all).14 Because a reverse-
engineering simulation event is both hypothesis-generative and confirmatory, the norms that 
govern the practice govern both scientific achievements. If my account is correct, reverse-
engineering simulations occur at a point of convergence between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. This is one way in which exploring the methodology of simulation 
practices in science challenges orthodox views about the scientific method.  
 In both the mystery beer case and the mystery cube case, the successful instance of 
reverse engineering yields a hypothesis about the target system and provides evidence for the 
hypothesis it yields. However, though each case is a successful instance of reverse engineering, it 
is clear that the success of the mystery beer reverse-engineering project provides much stronger 
evidence about the target system than the success of the mystery cube reverse-engineering 
project. I will attempt to explain why this is the case in the account that follows.  
                                                 
14 The terms of this distinction were introduced by Hans Reichenbach (1938), but they were initially employed for 
a more complex purpose than the purpose I note here. For a historical overview of the philosophical treatment of 
the distinction in the years since Reichenbach introduced it, see Schickore (2014). 
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 A key assumption underlying my account of what makes reverse engineering a valuable 
scientific practice is that, if you are able to reproduce the observable features of the target system 
in the simulation (e.g. the taste of the mystery beer), you have some evidence that the target 
system (e.g. the mystery beer's recipe) is analogous to the simulation (e.g. the process you 
undertook in brewing your reverse-engineered beer). More precisely: 
A match between the observed features of the target system and analogous 
features in the reverse-engineered simulation provides evidence that the 
unobserved features of the target system are similar to features of the simulation. 
 
In order to develop and defend this claim, I will address what I take to be the two most pressing 
questions about its content in the next two sections. The first question is: for what sort of 
similarity does the success of a reverse-engineered simulation provide evidence? The second 
question is: what determines the evidential weight of a successful reverse-engineering 
simulation? In answering these questions, I will substantiate my account of the distinctive 
function and scientific value of reverse engineering.  
 
 3.1 Similarity Between the Simulation and the Target System 
 
 Up to this point, I have been speaking of a successful case of reverse engineering as 
yielding a single hypothesis that posits some particular similarity between the target system and 
the simulation. This way of speaking, however, is really a shorthand for something more general. 
There are many ways of accurately describing the structure of any reverse-engineering 
simulation, and thus many descriptions of the successful simulation that can serve as hypotheses 
about the structure of the target system. On my account, all of the hypotheses about the target 
system that can be faithfully gleaned from a successful instance of reverse engineering are 
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incrementally confirmed when the simulation succeeds, though they may be confirmed to 
different degrees (for reasons that will be offered in the next section of this chapter).15 
 What are some notions of similarity that one might invoke in elucidating a hypothesis 
about a target system on the basis of a successful reverse-engineering attempt? Some promising 
possibilities can be found in the ideas that have been developed by structural realists. Structural 
realists say that scientists should be committed to the truth of the structural content of their 
theories rather than the literal content (see, for instance, Worrall 1989). Without taking a position 
in the realism debate, I will note that one might draw upon some of the ways that structural 
realists talk about the structure of a theory in order to spell out some of what it is that scientists 
have evidence for in a successful case of reverse engineering. I am not firmly committed to one 
of these being the single representational content of a successful reverse-engineering simulation, 
but I think they may plausibly capture some relationships of similarity that could be exploited by 
a scientist in spelling out a hypothesis that is confirmed by the success of a reverse-engineering 
attempt.  
 Some structural realists have proposed an isomorphism claim as the content of a scientific 
theory, properly understood (see, for instance, Van Fraassen 1980 and Suppes 2002). One idea 
here is that theories may not literally posit the entities they describe, but rather, their content is 
something like “the target system is actually structurally isomorphic to the system described by 
the theory.”16 Bas van Fraassen uses the term 'isomorphism' to mean “total identity of structure” 
                                                 
15 Some hypotheses may not be eligible for confirmation, and are therefore exceptions to this rule. If researchers 
were already maximally confident about some hypotheses that could be gleaned from a successful instance of 
reverse engineering, these hypotheses would obviously not be eligible to receive incremental confirmation.  
 
16 Another kind of structural realist might interpret the theory literally, but claim that scientists who accept the 
theory believe only in the truth of the theory's structural claims.  
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(1980, p. 10).17 It might be that, in a particular case, the claim that two things have exactly the 
same structure can only be expressed formally. For example, perhaps the structure might be 
expressible in a Ramsey sentence. Ramsey sentences were introduced originally by Frank 
Ramsey and later employed by Rudolf Carnap as a tool to identify a sense in which a theory that 
posits unobservables can be accepted as true and explanatory without committing its subscribers 
to accepting the existence of the unobservables posited.18 Rather than saying that there exist 
unobservable entities with various qualities, a Ramsey sentence says that there exist some things 
(without commenting on what those things are) that bear relations corresponding to the relations 
of the unobservable entities posited by the theory. The upshot of this, for a structural realist, is 
that all of the scientifically useful content of the theory is contained by the corresponding 
Ramsey sentence. This allows for a respect in which one can remain noncommittal regarding the 
unobservable posits of a theory without thereby undermining one's acceptance of the theory as an 
explanation of observed phenomena. The Ramsey sentence thus conveys structural information 
about the relations obtaining among the entities without identifying the entities. It may be 
reasonable in some cases to understand the hypothesis furnished and confirmed by a successful 
case of reverse engineering as taking the form of a Ramsey sentence.  
 Isomorphism is not the only notion of similarity that might be invoked to elucidate a 
hypothesis that is confirmed in a successful case of reverse engineering. Giere (1988, 2004), 
Teller (2001), and Grim et al (2013) have argued that an even more flexible notion of similarity 
                                                 
17 Another candidate for the shape a hypotheses gleaned from a successful case of reverse engineering might take 
is partial isomorphism (see, for instance, Da Costa and French 2003). This is a variation on the isomorphism 
account according to which theories can identify “partial structures,” and thus identify a relationship of partial 
isomorphism (p. 19). Da Costa and French tie this to their idea that theories might be “partially true” or “quasi- 
true.” 
 
18 For a clear discussion of Ramsey sentences and their role in the realism versus anti-realism debate, see Psillos 
(1999, pp. 40-69). For their original description, see Ramsey (1929). 
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applies to the relation between a successful model and its target system. The particular respect in 
which the target system is proposed to be similar to the representation, they argue, cannot be 
determined outside of a particular context, and so no precise, general account of this similarity is 
in the offing. Giere writes that scientists use models to represent systems “by picking out some 
specific features of the model that are then claimed to be similar to features of the designated real 
systems to some (perhaps fairly loosely indicated) degree of fit” (2004, p. 748). Grim et al 
(2013) nicely describe the multiplicity of the relationships of correspondence between a 
simulation and a target system: 
We believe that, from the perspective of simulation design, correspondence is not 
a single relation, but many – that what is really at issue is a wealth of relevant 
relations between representations and what is represented, and between 
simulations and what is simulated. Different conceptions of correspondence will 
be relevant to the different kinds of simulations that simulators make, and the 
different purposes to which their simulations are put. Different aspects of a single 
simulation may correspond to aspects of reality in different ways. On this 
approach, appreciation for the scientific function of simulations demands not that 
we find the one magic tie that is 'correspondence' but that we open our eyes to the 
many different ways in which simulations can simulate (p. 2371). 
 
As these authors suggest, a single simulation may bear many similarities to a target system. A 
well-defined hypothesis about some respect of similarity may take the form of one of the familiar 
notions of structural similarity mentioned above, but these need not exhaust the reasonable 
options for a researcher. Of course, scientists will attend to the hypotheses expressing similarity 
that are interesting to them, so various contextual features will determine which of the many 
similarity-expressing hypotheses receive attention.  
 In sum, I think the right way to understand these successful cases of reverse engineering 
is as evidentially rich devices that provide differing degrees of evidence for a great many 
different hypotheses about the target system. Each successful case incrementally confirms the 
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many hypotheses that accurately capture the representational content of the simulation. The 
similarities that are confirmed by successful cases of reverse-engineering simulations are diverse, 
and the degree of confirmation in a given case will depend on the particular similarity 
hypothesis.  
  
 3.2 Five Heuristics for the Evidential Value of Reverse-Engineering Simulations 
 
 As the comparison between the mystery cube case and the mystery beer case illustrates, 
the evidential weight of a successful reverse-engineering simulation is surely not the same in all 
instances. I noted above that I take all successful cases of reverse engineering to provide some 
evidence for similarity between the target system and the simulation. But the amount of evidence 
conferred by a successful match will differ from case to case as a function of certain features 
about the target system. In the case of the mystery cube, the weight of the evidence appears to be 
rather low. But in cases like the mystery beer case, the weight of the evidence provided by a 
successful match between the observable features of the target system and some observable 
features of the simulation seems to be much greater. 
 I will now identify five features that often contribute to the evidential weight of a 
successful reverse-engineering simulation. These features are intuitively plausible influences on 
the evidential weight of a successful reverse-engineering simulation. They are also 
considerations that practicing scientists are sensitive to in reverse-engineering simulation 
projects. I will illustrate each feature by referencing the mystery beer and mystery cube cases. 
Ultimately, I will explain why each feature is a good heuristic for scientists to use, both for 
evaluating the potential payoff of undertaking a reverse-engineering simulation project (for 
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hypothesis generation), and for assessing the evidential value of a successful simulation. The 
former goal belongs to the context of discovery and the latter goal belongs to the context of 
justification, but the heuristics I identify simultaneously serve both. This illustrates how a single 
instance of reverse-engineering is part of both contexts and, therefore, the norms that govern the 
simulation practice are part of both contexts. My explanation of why these are often valuable 
heuristics will employ some tools from Bayesian Confirmation Theory.  
 
  3.2.1 Complexity of the Observed Behavior of the Target System 
 
 The first good heuristic for assessing the evidential value of a reverse-engineering 
simulation is the idea that, typically, the evidential weight of a successful reverse-engineering 
simulation will be greater insofar as the observed behavior of the target system is complex. This 
idea has a great deal of intuitive appeal if you consider the simple cases discussed above. The 
taste of a beer can be a very complex phenomenon. Imagine that, in the case of the mystery beer, 
Sara is able to identify six distinct tastes that are detectable at different stages of sampling the 
original beer with a clear palate. Presumably different combinations of these tastes, as well as 
additional tastes, are detectable when the beer is paired with certain foods. The taste of the beer 
when consumed at room temperature differs from its taste when consumed cold. Different tastes 
emerge when the beer is consumed at various intervals after a bottle is opened. The observable 
feature of the beer that Sara sets out to simulate – its taste – is a multi-faceted feature.  
 By contrast, the vibrating pattern Jay observes in the mystery cube is actually quite 
simple. While perhaps the feature that Jay seeks to simulate is very specific – a precise frequency 
and amplitude of the vibrations when measured by a vibrometer – it is not a multi-faceted feature 
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in the same way that the taste of Sara's mystery beer is. The vibration pattern is, for instance, 
invariant across all of the contexts in which Jay observes it. Its simplicity allows it to be detected 
by a simple non-human measuring device in the way that taste cannot be. The simplicity of the 
observed behavior of the target system makes it relatively easy to mimic, and it is therefore more 
likely that an attempt will be successful. Thus, the success of an attempt to reverse engineer the 
mystery cube is, all else equal, less evidentially weighty than the success of an attempt to reverse 
engineer the mystery beer.  
 Why is this a good heuristic? Complexity matters in these cases because complexity often 
tracks surprisingness. By this, I mean that complex phenomena are typically those that are 
assigned a lower prior probability in their comparison classes. In the beer case, the particular 
flavor profile is rare in the comparison class of beers. In the cube case, one complication is that 
the comparison class is not well-defined. If you imagine that the class is, say, cubes vibrating in 
patterns, the simple pattern that Jay observed might be less rare than a more complex pattern, but 
it is somewhat hard to see why that would be. Jay knows so little about the mystery cube that 
there is not a clear, natural comparison class to place it in. Because we cannot assess the 
observed vibration of the mystery cube as being particularly surprising, Jay's successful reverse-
engineering project does not have the same evidential advantage that Sara's does. In many cases, 
with very commonsensical suppositions that come from our background knowledge about the 
comparison class to which the reverse-engineered system belongs, the complexity of the system 
will contribute to a higher degree of surprisingness.  
 An example offered by Elliott Sober provides a useful analogy here. Sober notes that two 
individuals' having the same surname is evidence that they are biologically related, but different 
cases in which two individuals share a surname provide different degrees of confirmation for the 
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hypothesis that the two are related (1988, pp. 213-215). In particular, he argues that the fact that 
two people share the name “Smith” is weaker evidence for a relatedness hypothesis than the fact 
that two people share the name “Quackdoodle.” Why is this so? You might reasonably adopt the 
heuristic that “a match of more complex surnames, all else being equal, provides greater 
confirmation for a relatedness hypothesis than a match of less complex surnames.” This heuristic 
might be useful, but it will ultimately be useful only in cases in which the complex surname in 
question (e.g. “Quackdoodle”) is rarer than the simpler surname (e.g. “Smith”). What really 
matters is that a match between individuals with a rare surname provides stronger evidence for a 
relatedness hypothesis than a match between individuals with a common surname. Sober's 
example connects to my analysis of the complexity heuristic in the following way: having the 
same surname is analogous to a target system and a simulation exhibiting the same observed 
behavior, and a relatedness hypothesis is analogous to a similarity hypothesis. Ultimately, the 
observed behavior's rarity, rather than its complexity, is really responsible for determining the 
evidential weight of a successful case of reverse engineering; but complexity often tracks rarity, 
and so the utility of this heuristic is considerable.  
 According to the central principle of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, your new 
confidence in a hypothesis should be equal to your prior confidence in the hypothesis multiplied 
by your prior confidence in the hypothesis given the evidence, divided by the prior probability of 
the evidence.19 In other words, if p' is your new probability (confidence), e is your evidence, and 
h is the hypothesis, the following should hold: 
p'(h) = p(e|h)p(h) 
  p(e) 
                                                 
19 There are many good introductions to Bayesian confirmation theory, including Howson and Urbach (2006), and 
Strevens (2012). 
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The low expectedness of the observed behavior of the target system is represented as a low value 
for the prior probability of the evidence (bolded). It is easy to see why a low value for p(e) will 
make your new confidence in the hypothesis greater, and so it is easy to see why something that 
tracks a low level of expectedness (in other words, a high level of surprisingness) will be a good 
heuristic for increasing the evidential weight of a reverse-engineering simulation. In much of 
scientific practice, more complicated, idiosyncratic phenomena will have a lower prior 
probability. So, the complexity of the observed behavior of a target system will be a good 
indicator that if a reverse-engineering attempt is successful, the simulation will provide more 
evidence for the hypotheses it furnishes than it would if the observed behavior were simple. It is 
therefore a pertinent consideration for both discovery and justification. 
  
  3.2.2 Simplicity of the Reverse-engineered System 
 
 A second useful heuristic is that the evidential weight of a successful reverse-engineering 
simulation will typically be greater insofar as the simulation is simple. A simpler system, as I am 
thinking of it here, is one that admits more ways of being realized physically. As I mentioned 
above, I take a successful case of reverse engineering to furnish multiple hypotheses at different 
levels of description. These hypotheses will nearly always be multiply realizable, and a 
simulation that can be realized in more ways is one that will, ceteris paribus, bear more 
evidential weight than one that can be realized in fewer ways. Insofar as a simulation exhibits 
greater simplicity, it promises to give resultant hypotheses greater confirmatory weight, and this 
is a reason to favor simpler avenues of discovery.  
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 Imagine that Sara has succeeded in reverse engineering the mystery beer with two 
recipes. She tries both several times, and both succeed equally well in mimicking the taste of the 
mystery beer. The first recipe has few ingredients and rather imprecise instructions (e.g. “add a 
dash of coriander sometime while the wort is boiling”) The second recipe has many ingredients 
and rather precise instructions (e.g. “add exactly 18g of coriander after the wort has been boiling 
for 10 minute). There are more ways of realizing the first recipe than the second recipe, and this 
makes it more likely, all other things being equal, that the structure of the target system is 
captured by the first simulation. The first simulation is simpler in the sense of being less specific 
(more multiply-realizable), and therefore bears greater evidential weight than the second 
simulation.  
 The tools of Bayesian confirmation theory help explain why the simplicity of the 
simulated system offers a good heuristic. The simplicity of a hypothesis tends to contribute to a 
higher pr(h), the prior probability of the hypothesis. Why does simplicity track the higher prior 
probability of the hypothesis? The prior probability of the hypothesis will be the probability of 
the disjunction of the hypotheses, each of which specifies one of the (mutually exclusive) ways 
for the system to be realized. So, the prior probability of the hypothesis will be the sum of the 
prior probabilities of all the systems that realize the hypothesis. In many cases, all of the 
realizations of a hypothesis will be subjectively equiprobable, and so the hypothesis that has 
more realizations will have a higher prior probability.20 Therefore, in such a case, the hypothesis 
that is consistent with more physical realizations will end up with a higher value for p'(h), the 
posterior probability of the hypothesis.  
                                                 
20 “More realizations” may be best understood in a measure-theoretic sense here, given the possibility of infinitely 
many realizations.  
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 Notably, it is not only the number of systems that can realize a hypothesis that matters in 
determining the prior probability of that hypothesis. In some cases, the various hypotheses, each 
of which specifies one way for the original hypothesis to be realized, will not be equiprobable. A 
hypothesis that is consistent with a great many antecedently highly unlikely systems can have a 
much lower prior probability than a hypothesis that is consistent with a small number of 
antecedently highly likely systems. So although the simulation's simplicity will often be a good 
indicator of greater evidential import in a successful case of reverse engineering, this will not 
always be the case. For this reason, the role of simplicity here is best understood as a good 
heuristic.  
   
  3.2.3 How Much Your Background Knowledge Rules Out 
 
 A third good heuristic is that, all else being equal, the evidential weight of a successful 
reverse-engineering simulation is greater insofar as the reverse-engineering process is 
constrained by relevant background knowledge. Compared to Sara's design process, Jay's design 
process is constrained by very little relevant background information. In designing his 
simulation, Jay's process is informed by some basic scientific information and some engineering 
principles. Presumably, it would be good practice for Jay to draw upon information from other 
sources about what physical processes tend to cause vibration, and to reason analogically from 
those other cases to develop his simulation of the mystery cube. Beyond this, however, Jay has 
little background knowledge to inform his attempt to reverse engineer the mystery cube. In 
particular, there are few possibilities about the physical details of the system that Jay is in a 
position to conclusively rule out. The relative dearth of background knowledge in Jay's case is at 
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least partially explicable by the fact that unlike “beers,” “cubes vibrating in simple patterns” is 
not a familiar category of systems that it would be natural to investigate as a class in order to 
guide a reverse-engineering project. While Sara can appeal to her background knowledge that all 
beers are made with yeast to to guide the reverse-engineering process in the case of the beer, 
there are few such pieces of background knowledge about vibrating cubes by which Jay might be 
guided.  
 The Bayesian story that explains why this is a good heuristic is the following: a greater 
number of possibilities about the details of the target system that are ruled out by background 
knowledge contributes to a higher value for the prior probability of a hypothesis. When your 
background knowledge has ruled out many possible systems, your prior probability in the 
hypothesis will typically be greater than if it had ruled out fewer possible systems. In such a 
case, your background knowledge has effectively confirmed the hypothesis in question.21 When 
there is more background knowledge, the degree of confirmation will be greater, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, this feature often (though not always) indicates the greater confirmatory value of a 
successful reverse-engineering attempt, and so serves as a marker of a worthwhile path for 
hypothesis generation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21  There are two complications that should be noted here. First, given that the scientists' background 
knowledge is acquired before they formulate the hypotheses, the confirmation event is subject to the problem of old 
evidence (See Glymour 1980). Second, there is no standardly accepted Bayesian rule about what initial probability 
should be assigned to a newly formulated hypothesis, so comparative assessments are somewhat fraught.  
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  3.2.4 Fit between the Medium of Representation and the Target System 
 
 A fourth heuristic is that (all else being equal) the evidential weight of a successful 
reverse-engineering simulation is greater insofar as the medium of representation is well suited 
to depict the target system. A medium of representation is well suited to reverse-engineer a target 
system just in case the researchers know that the medium and the target system share properties 
that, according to their background knowledge, are likely to be enabling conditions of the 
observed behavior they set out to simulate. 
  Consider the medium of representation that Jay employs in the mystery cube case. He 
does not recognize the material that forms the surface of the original cube, so he is forced to 
settle for something that feels similar, though not identical. He must accept this mismatch 
between the material of the original cube and the material of his reverse-engineered cube as a 
representational shortcoming from the outset. Thus, the mystery cube simulation exhibits an 
imperfect fit between at least one aspect of the medium of representation and the target system. 
 For Sara, on the other hand, it is possible that her simulation is composed of the very 
same ingredients used to brew the mystery beer. She may indeed have stumbled upon exactly the 
right recipe. While this possibility of an exact match represents the closest possible fit between a 
medium of representation and the target system, Sara's simulation may also exhibit a high degree 
of fit even if it deviates from the actual recipe slightly. Given all of her background knowledge 
about what ingredients are likely to feature in the beer, she is in a good position to accomplish a 
close fit between the medium of representation and the target system. This is an additional reason 
to think that the success of Sara's reverse-engineering simulation bears much more evidential 
weight than the success of Jay's reverse-engineering simulation.  
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 Notice that, in both of these toy cases, I have assessed the fit between the medium of 
representation and the target system in terms of the expected similarity between the matter that 
comprises the target system and the matter out of which the representation is constructed. 
However, the relevant sort of fit is not always determined by material similarity. In the case study 
I present in Section 5, for example, the degree of fit is determined independently of the 
simulation's material similarity to the target system.  
 Like the simplicity of the simulation and the number of possibilities ruled out by 
background knowledge, a high degree of fit between the medium of representation and the target 
system will tend to contribute to a higher prior probability in the hypothesis. When you think that 
a medium fits the target system well, your prior probability in any hypothesis presented in that 
medium will be higher. This can be true even when the hypothesis being confirmed merely posits 
an abstract structural similarity between the simulation and the target system, as I illustrate by 
example in section 5.5. So, it is a good heuristic that a simulation with a high degree of fit 
between the medium of representation and the target system has greater evidential import, and 
therefore greater hypothesis generation prospects.22  
 
  3.2.5 Predictive Scope 
 
 The final heuristic I will mention is that (all else being equal) the evidential weight of a 
successful reverse-engineering simulation is greater insofar as the reverse-engineered system 
                                                 
22 This heuristic could be subsumed under the one that I gave in the previous section (in which a greater number of 
possibilities about the details of the target system that are ruled out by background knowledge contributes to a 
greater prior probability in the hypothesis), but I mention it separately because of its special importance as a 
consideration in designing and assessing the evidential prospects of computer simulations.  
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manages to predict data about the behavior of the observed system that was not taken into 
account in the design of the reverse-engineered system. 
 In both the case of the mystery beer and the case of the mystery cube, the simulations are 
designed with the explicit intention of mimicking a particular set of observed behaviors. 
However, in both cases, there may be other features of the target system's behavior – features not 
taken into account by the designers of the simulation – that could be successfully mirrored by the 
reverse-engineered simulation as well. In Sara's case, her simulation successfully predicts the 
color of the beer, though it was reverse engineered only to match the taste of the beer. This 
simulation should certainly be taken to carry more evidential weight than a simulation that 
matches the taste perfectly but does not successfully predict the color. Jay does not predict any 
features of the mystery cube apart from the behavior he designed his system to imitate, so his 
simulation does not receive such an evidential boost.23 
 In Bayesian terms, it will be part of the scientists' background knowledge either that all of 
the successfully replicated features of the target system were known at the time of the completion 
of the reverse-engineering simulation (i.e. they were merely accommodated), or that some of the 
replicated features were not known in advance (i.e. they were successfully predicted). This 
background knowledge will assign a higher prior probability, all else being equal, to hypotheses 
that accurately predict some other features of the system than to hypotheses that do not. As with 
the three preceding heuristics, greater predictive scope typically contributes to a higher prior 
                                                 
23 Though it is notoriously difficult to spell out exactly why prediction ought to provide greater evidential support 
for a hypothesis than accommodation, the intuition that it does is persistent. My view is that a simulation that 
manages to predict features of a target system not yet observed by the investigator should get a greater 
confirmatory boost for matching the data in a case of prediction than it would in an instance of mere 
accommodation. For the classic discussion of the evidential value of prediction versus accommodation, see 
Whewell (1957) and Mill (1982). For contemporary accounts of the value of prediction over accommodation, see 
Maher (1988) and Hitchcock and Sober (2004).  
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probability in the hypothesis, and therefore tends to provide greater evidence about the 
simulation's target system. So, predictive scope is another indicator of the potential value of a 
simulation with regard to both discovery and justification. 
  
 3.3 Conclusion 
 
 There are, presumably, very many ways to successfully reverse engineer the mystery cube 
system, and there are not many constraints on Jay's reverse-engineering project to help narrow 
that possibility space. Discovering one way to reproduce the mystery cube's vibration pattern 
seems to provide some evidence about the cube's mechanism, but only a small amount. On the 
other hand, identifying one way of successfully reverse engineering the mystery beer, given how 
much the possibility space is narrowed by Sara's simulation performing well in each of the five 
criteria above, is a significant achievement. We should therefore take Sara's successful 
simulation to carry a great deal more evidential weight than Jay's. 
 
4. Case Study: Ideal Adaptive Agent Learning Simulations 
 
 Human learning is a complicated phenomenon that has received considerable attention 
from psychologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists. There are many scientifically 
interesting questions about human learning for which there are no settled, complete answers. One 
question at the center of a flourishing research project in cognitive science is why some general 
patterns are consistently observed across human populations in learning scenarios of all kinds. 
These observed regularities in human learning are paradigm cases of phenomena of great 
32 
 
scientific interest that arise from a system (mental processing) about which the physical details 
are not well known. As a result of this limitation, a starting point for developing hypotheses 
about how humans learn that has gained popularity recently in cognitive science is the practice of 
attempting to reverse engineer human learning through computer simulations. As an example of 
this practice, I will consider a fairly simple simulation study conducted by Stellan Ohlsson James 
and Jewett (1997).24 
 As in the toy cases above, researchers seeking to reverse engineer human learning attempt 
to develop simulations that match some observed phenomena. The data that Ohlsson and Jewett 
set out to simulate are two robust trends across subject populations and tasks: the rate of 
improvement in learning and the power law of learning. The first trend is the fact that 
“improvement is rapid in the beginning of practice and... the rate of change decreases smoothly 
as mastery is approached” (1997, p. 142). The second trend is the power law of learning: that, “if 
the time to complete the task is plotted as a function of the number of practice trials, the result is 
a negatively accelerated curve, the so-called learning curve,” which has the shape of a power law 
function (p. 142).25 The researchers aim to simultaneously simulate both of these general trends.  
 Ohlsson and Jewett first develop a computer program in which they “set down 
assumptions that specify a class or family of possible systems” (1997, p. 139). The possible 
systems they devise in their programs have two parts: ideal adaptive agents (simulated learners) 
and task environments. Though the ultimate target system is actual human learning, the idealized 
agents are starkly different from actual human learners in many ways. Among other differences, 
                                                 
24 See Ohlsson 2011 for a historical overview of the emergence of this practice in the study of learning (pp. 188-
191).  
 
25 Power law equations have the general form: P = A + Bt-a . In this case, P = time to perform a task; t = amount of 
practice measured in number of trials; A = the point beyond which improvement is physically or logically 
impossible; B = performance on the first trial; a = the learning rate (Ohlsson and Jewett 1997, p. 143).  
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the simulated agents have perfect access to feedback (i.e. immediate information about whether 
each choice they make is the correct one), perfect efficiency in responding to feedback, perfect 
attentiveness to the task at hand, perfect memory, and other idealized features (p. 158). The task 
environment consists of a situation tree, a series of connected steps with branching options at 
each step (p. 146). The agent “chooses” which of the available options to take, and the chosen 
option gives rise to new options for the agent to choose among at the next step. There is only one 
correct pathway through the branches, the traversing of which constitutes a successful trial.26 The 
agents change their approaches to these tasks in response to their environments in order to 
improve their procedures for achieving their goals (p. 139). The decision mechanism that 
determines their “choices” about how to proceed in each attempt to complete a task is 
probabilistic: the probability that a branch will be taken by the agent is determined by the path's 
strength, which is a quantitative parameter that reflects past experience (p. 147). These simulated 
agents are adaptive because the strength of a possible path through the task environment changes 
in response to an agent's experience traversing the situation tree.   
 The final ingredients in these computer simulations are learning mechanisms that 
determine how the agents respond to the feedback they receive. The ways in which the simulated 
agents respond to the feedback they receive at each step of an attempt to perform a task are what 
enable them to “learn.” The simulated agents are given a decision mechanism – a means of 
adjudicating among the available options at each step. One or more decision mechanisms may be 
added in each run of the simulations. In the simple cases I am describing here, Ohlsson and 
Jewett experiment with only two learning mechanisms: strengthening and error correction. 
                                                 
26 In the simple simulations conducted by Ohlsson and Jewett, the default path length (number of steps required to 
complete the task) was twenty steps and the default branch factor (number of options available at each step) was 
ten options (1997, p. 151). 
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When the strengthening mechanism is added to a simulation, the strength of an option-selection 
rule is incremented when that rule leads the learner to an action that is followed by a positive 
outcome (1997, p. 148). When the error correction mechanism is added, the simulated learner 
never repeats unsuccessful options (p. 149). 
 Once these simple parameters are in place, the scientists are in a position to run the 
computer programs and analyze their simulations of learning. In Ohlsson and Jewett's studies, 
each of twenty simulated agents repeatedly traverses a situation tree, simulating practice (1997, 
p. 151). The simulated agents continue to traverse the tree, adapting with each trial, until they 
meet the criterion of mastery: the completion of three consecutive error-free trials. Because the 
decision mechanism is probabilistic, the number of trials until the criterion of mastery is reached 
differs from run to run for simulated agents with the same initial conditions. In the analysis 
component of these simulation studies, the scientists run multiple 20-agent iterations of the 
computer simulations, tweaking aspects of the simulations (in this case, the operative learning 
mechanisms) to see what rates of learning and learning curves are generated. Ohlsson and Jewett 
reported the results of three analyses: a comparative analysis, a sensitivity analysis, and an 
analysis of interaction effects (1997).27 In each case, they plotted curves mapping the average of 
                                                 
27 In the comparative analysis, Ohlsson and Jewett compared the curve generated using only the learning 
mechanism of strengthening with the curve generated by using only the learning mechanism of error correction 
(1997, p. 152). They found that the error correction agents required an average of approximately nine trials to 
reach the criterion of mastery, whereas strengthening agents required approximately eighty trials. Strengthening 
alone generates a power law learning curve with a learning rate that approximates the rate found in empirical 
studies of actual human learners. Error correction alone generates an exponential learning curve rather than a 
power law learning curve, which is at odds with empirical findings in studies of actual human learning. In 
addition, the researchers note, the error correction model learns at a faster rate than humans ever do, according to 
the available data.  
  In the sensitivity analysis, the scientists set out to determine if the learning mechanisms (strengthening and 
error correction) were robust across tasks and subject populations (as the power law of learning, observed in 
actual human subjects, is) (1997, p. 155). To this end, the scientists varied the strength increment, the efficiency 
with which errors are detected and corrected, and the complexity of the task. They found that, when the strength 
increment is significantly above or below a certain value (in this case, .2), the resultant curve no longer fit the 
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the simulated agents' performances – the number of steps above the minimum possible number 
of steps to completion – across trials. These analyses enable the researchers to compare the 
results of their simulations directly with the empirical data that they ultimately desire to mimic. 
In each analysis, researchers drew lessons from the closeness of fit between these simulated 
results and the results observed in actual human subjects: the rate of learning and the power law 
of learning. These lessons include observations about which learning mechanism seem to have 
greater roles in determining specific aspects of the rate and curve generated, and which learning 
mechanisms yield results that are especially divergent from the trends in actual human learning.  
 Ohlsson (2011) depicts the ultimate goal of these simulation practices as the eventual 
construction of a simulation with just the right combination of learning mechanisms. He focuses 
on a combination of nine learning mechanisms postulated by cognitive scientists (including 
strengthening and error correction), most of which have not yet been satisfactorily represented in 
computer simulations. He writes: 
We should not expect to derive empirical phenomena from any one mechanism by 
itself, even though the majority of research studies attempt precisely such single-
                                                                                                                                                             
power law of learning that is observed in the empirical data with human subjects. So, the strengthening 
increment interval within which strengthening produces a learning curve that has both the empirically observed 
shape and the empirically observed learning rate is quite narrow. When the researchers varied the efficiency with 
which errors are detected and corrected, the rate of learning that occurred with error correction alone was 
strongly influenced by changes in the rate. However, the shape of the curve with error correction alone remained 
the same across variations in efficiency. Finally, the researchers varied the complexity of the task. They changed 
the length of the task and the number of branching options at each step, and found that the shapes of the curves 
generated by strengthening alone and error correction alone remained the same across large variations.  
  In the interaction effects analysis, Ohlsson and Jewett combined the error correction mechanism and the 
strengthening mechanism in one simulation (1997, p. 163). They found that the shape of the curve was the same 
as with strengthening alone (and therefore matched the power law of human learning), but the rate of learning 
was nearly the same as with error correction alone (and so much faster than humans ever actually learn, 
according to the empirical data). The interaction model reached the criterion of mastery in just ten trials. The 
researchers note that this is contrary to their expectation that the two-mechanism curve would be intermediate 
between the two curves produced by two single-mechanism cases in both the rate and the shape of the curve, and 
conclude that the two learning mechanisms appear to control separate aspects of the resultant curve (p. 164).  
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mechanism tests. The more telling test would compare data with predictions 
derived from a model that can learn in all nine ways. (2013, p. 204) 
 
According to Ohlsson, the development of this complete nine-mode simulation is a far-off goal. 
He writes that “Developing such a model is a task for the future. The first century of skill 
acquisition research prepared the ground and put the main conceptual support in place, but 
finalizing the theory might take a second century” (p. 204). The simple simulation analyses 
presented above, then, are best understood as “putting the main conceptual support in place.” 
They are preliminary steps in the development of a comprehensive simulation that is expected to 
succeed at mimicking the empirically observable trends in human learning: a broad project of 
reverse engineering human learning via computer simulations.  
 The researchers working on this project will not be in a position to perform the ultimate 
test of the hypothetical model they are building until all nine mechanisms have been rendered in 
a computer program because, as Ohlsson notes, “any observed behavioral regularity is a 
cumulative result of the interactions among all the different learning mechanisms” (2011, p. 
261).28 Given Ohlsson's analysis of this overarching learning simulation enterprise, the goal of 
the preliminary simulation work conducted by Ohlsson and Jewett is to develop ingredients to be 
used in a future simulation – one that will hopefully match the trends in the observable learning 
behavior and also satisfy other success criteria the researchers have in mind. So, I claim, the 
simulation analyses performed by Ohlsson and Jewett can reasonably be understood as a sort of 
                                                 
28 Once the nine learning mechanisms have been satisfactorily represented in a computer simulation, the procedure 
for determining whether they all remain in the simulation that Ohlsson envisions is one in which researchers run 
a simulation with each mechanism left out while the remaining eight proposed learning mechanisms are in place. 
Each mechanism earns its place in the comprehensive simulation if it adds accommodative power to the model, 
that is, if the model that includes it alongside the other eight mechanisms “does a better job of accounting for the 
data than a model without that mechanism” (2011, p. 204).  
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tool-construction for a broader reverse-engineering project in which these researchers are 
participating.  
 
5. Analysis of the Ideal Adaptive Agent Simulation Practice as Reverse Engineering 
 
 My rational reconstruction of reverse-engineering simulations will explain why the ideal 
adaptive agent simulation program is promising enough to be worth undertaking. The program is 
worth undertaking because it has relatively good prospects at generating hypotheses about 
human learning that will bring with them a significant degree of confirmation at the time they are 
generated. If my description of the appeal of the heuristics identified above is correct, one would 
expect the researchers working on this project to employ the heuristics I identified above to 
guide their efforts to evaluate the extent to which their simulations furnish evidence regarding 
the target system (human learners). Indeed, as I will show in this section, researchers often 
appear to be sensitive to the features that I identify as useful heuristics.  
 As I argued above, the simple simulations conducted by Ohlsson and Jewett should be 
seen as a sort of tool-development practice to enable progress toward the ultimate, complete 
simulation of human learning described by Ohlsson. I will now argue that the heuristics I 
proposed apply to both the preliminary simulation studies discussed above and to the far-off 
nine-mode simulation that Ohlsson envisions as the ultimate goal of the research project. 
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 5.1 Complexity of the Observed Behavior of the Target System 
 
 The observed behavior that the systems are designed to mimic is actually quite simple. 
The authors frequently emphasize that the power law shape of the learning curve is robust across 
task and subject populations, as are fluctuations in the average rate of learning across kinds of 
tasks. So, the observed behavior exhibits a low degree of complexity. Given the heuristic I 
offered above in which the complexity of the observed behavior gives more evidential weight to 
a successful case of reverse engineering a system, one might worry that this reverse-engineering 
project is not very promising from the outset.  
 However, because complexity only boosts the evidential weight of a successful 
simulation insofar as it contributes to the surprisingness of observed behavior, there would be 
cause for such concern only if the observed behavior that the researchers are interested in 
mimicking were not very surprising. Interestingly, in this case complexity does not track 
surprisingness. The researchers find it surprising that the power law and rate of learning are 
robust across task and subject populations. They remark that this robustness is “puzzling,” and 
ask “why is the shape of the learning curve not affected by the properties of particular learning 
scenarios?” (Ohlsson and Jewett 1997, p. 155). They take it to be a curiosity in need of 
explanation that the shape of the learning curve does not change across subject populations and 
across different kinds of tasks. So the prior probability of the evidence is not especially high for 
the researchers, even though the observed behavior is relatively simple. The enterprise should 
not, then, be seen as hindered from the start by a low degree of complexity of the observed 
behavior. On the contrary, the low expectedness of the observed phenomenon is a mark in favor 
of the evidential prospects of a reverse-engineering attempt.  
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 5.2 Simplicity of the Reverse-engineered System 
 
 These simulation practices clearly exhibit an impressive degree of simplicity, and this is 
acknowledged repeatedly as a virtue of the simulations, over and above its merely pragmatic 
benefit, by the researchers who run the simulations. The ideal adaptive agents are quite simple, 
as are their situation-tree task environments and the learning mechanisms. Despite reasonable 
concerns about the idealized agents in these simulations being dramatically different from actual 
human learners, the fact that the buildings blocks of these learning simulations incorporate 
relatively few specific assumptions about the features of the learners (no specific assumptions 
about, for example, the neurochemistry of brain processes) increases their likelihood of yielding 
accurate information about actual human learning. 
 The highly simplified depictions of agents and their practices in the simulations give the 
simulation a higher degree of multiple-realizability, and so this is a reason to think the ultimate 
simulation the researchers aim at will have more evidential weight than it would if the 
simulations were more specific. This rationale for favoring simple simulations is not directly 
cited by the researchers, but the following passage is illuminating in this regard:  
The focus on fundamental factors is the reason why ideal models are simple. A 
complex event or phenomenon does not necessarily have a complex core... the 
simplification that is characteristic of idealization is neither a weakness nor its 
purpose, but a side effect of focusing on what is fundamental. (Ohlsson and 
Jewett 1997, p. 168)  
 
I submit that, by speaking of “fundamental factors” here, Ohlsson and Jewett are referring to 
factors that could be realized in many physical systems. Therefore, I take their talk of the 
systems' aptness to identifying what might be the “fundamental factors” involved in human 
learning to be an application of the multiple-realizability heuristic I identified above.  
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5.3 Background Knowledge 
 
 Ohlsson and Jewett are operating with a high number of constraints provided by their 
background knowledge about the nature of human learning. Ohlsson's confidence that the nine 
mechanisms he identifies (some of which the researches have not yet been able to represent in a 
computer program) play a part in human learning is due to a combination of commonsense 
suppositions about human learning and evidence about the nature of human learning gleaned 
from a variety of empirical studies in cognitive science. Both of these features severely limit the 
space of possible systems that could be developed in a successful reverse-engineering simulation 
of adaptive agent learning. Of course, there are still very many ways the computer simulation of 
human learning might mimic the observed trends in the data, but the complexity of the system 
and our background knowledge provide reasons to think there is a much narrower range of 
possibilities than in the case of the mystery cube, for example. In light of this wealth of relevant 
background knowledge that rules out possibilities, the evidential weight of a successful nine-
mode simulation should, all else being equal, be relatively high.  
  
 5.4 Predictive Scope 
  
 The predictive scope of the simulation practice cannot reasonably be evaluated until the 
nine-mode model is complete, so it is not clear at present how this simulation practice will fare 
on this score. One thing to note, however, is that Ohlsson identifies as one of “the main 
methodological advantages of the simulation technique” that “the model, once constructed, can 
be applied to derive predictions...” (1988, p. 15). This ability to generate predictions comes from 
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the potential for the ultimate simulation to be “complete” in a particular sense identified by 
Ohlsson: 
Perception, memory, and thinking are involved in every cognitive performance. 
It follows that there cannot be a theory of problem solving, or of memory or of 
perception, because such a theory could not be tested against data; only complete 
systems, which have the entire range of capabilities (albeit, perhaps, in 
simplified form), and which shows explicitly the interactions between them, only 
such theories, the simulationist claims, can be meaningfully compared to 
empirical data. (1988, p. 14, my italics) 
 
Clearly, Ohlsson is sensitive to the importance of predictive success down the line. The ultimate 
nine-mode simulation of learning will improve its chances at providing evidence for the 
hypotheses it generates about human learning if it has greater predictive scope, and it can only do 
that if it is “complete.” Ohlsson thinks computer programs have especially good prospects at 
simulating complete systems. If he is right about the prospects of this simulation method to 
eventually derive predictions, this makes this practice more likely to provide good evidence 
about the target system, other things being equal, than other methods of simulating learning that 
are not so well-suited to generating predictions (such as simulations that are merely 
accommodative). 
 
 5.5 Fit between the Medium of Representation and the Target System 
 
 For several reasons, a computer program is often thought by researchers to be an 
especially apt medium for simulating mental processes. If there is good reason to think that a 
computer program can sometimes represent mental processes well, then this is a reason to 
attribute greater evidential weight to a reverse-engineered simulation of human learning that 
takes the form of a computer program than one that employs some other medium. One focus of 
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the researchers in extolling the virtues of computer programs as the medium of representation for 
this simulation task is the ease with which computer programs can represent strategies: 
From the psychological point of view, programs are like cognitive strategies: 
problem solving strategies, attentional strategies, rehearsal strategies, 
memorization strategies, etc., of which modern cognitive science is full. If we 
have a (sufficiently specific) hypothesis about what strategy a person is applying 
to some cognitive task, we can specify that strategy in a programming language. 
Since the computer can read and execute such a specification (as long as the 
conventions of the particular programming language have been followed 
precisely), loading the program into the machine enables the machine to apply 
that strategy. Program execution and thinking are similar in that both processes 
consist in the application of a strategy to a task. (Ohlsson 1988, p. 12) 
 
Here, Ohlsson explains why a computer program is a particularly appropriate medium for 
representing mental processes. All else being equal, the relevant heuristic suggests, a successful 
reverse-engineering simulation that exhibits a high degree of fit between the medium of 
representation and the target system should confer greater evidence on hypotheses furnished by 
the reverse-engineering simulation. The ideal adaptive agent simulations seem to score 
particularly well on this criterion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 If my account of the scientific role of reverse-engineering simulations is correct, the 
project in which Ohlsson and Jewett are participants appears to have reasonably good prospects 
of yielding hypotheses about human learning that will be significantly confirmed by the success 
of the reverse-engineering attempt. I have provided evidence that these researchers are sensitive 
to the considerations I have identified, and I take this to be a mark in favor of my account. Given 
the motivation I offered for the five heuristics and their underlying justification, I expect that this 
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account will generalize to other reverse-engineering simulation projects as well. Though the 
confirmatory value of a successful reverse-engineering simulation may often be modest, I take 
my account to show why, in situations for which severe observational limits are in place, 
simulating a phenomenon via reverse-engineering is a reasonable way forward. Even a 
hypothesis with modest confirmatory value is a vast improvement over the bleak epistemic 
situation in which these scientists begin.  
 More generally, in characterizing this practice, I have presented a counter-example to the 
orthodox view that the scientific achievements of hypothesis generation and hypothesis 
justification are distinct events, governed by distinct norms. Upon successfully running a 
reverse-engineering simulation, a scientist at once generates and confirms a hypothesis about the 
target system. The five heuristics that I identified for assessing the evidential value of a reverse-
engineering simulation are norms of good scientific practice that govern both of these scientific 
achievements, and therefore demonstrate an overlap between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification. 
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CHAPTER 3: HOW-POSSIBLY SIMULATIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, philosophers of science are beginning to acknowledge a 
wide variety of roles that computer simulations play in contemporary science. These roles 
include making predictions, generating and testing hypotheses, providing explanations, and a 
variety of other functions. But one role that has received very little attention is the role that 
computer simulations can play in explaining how certain puzzling states of affairs are possible. I 
will refer to simulations that achieve this function as how-possibly simulations because they 
furnish how-possibly explanations. How-possibly explanations differ from what I will call why-
actually explanations (the more familiar category of scientific explanations discussed by 
philosophers of science) in a number of ways that will be explored in this chapter.29 In order to 
identify the distinct explanatory functions played by how-possibly simulations, I will rely on two 
cases: a simple toy case and a case study from scientific practice. The latter is an 
interdisciplinary investigation into the mechanisms underlying bird-flock formation that has 
progressed over the last three decades as a result of advances in computer simulation technology. 
Ultimately, ornithologists used computer simulations to explain how it is possible for birds to 
flock without a leader bird.  
                                                 
29 I call them why-actually explanations here because they explain why actual states of affairs obtain. See Salmon 
(1989) for a helpful overview of this category of scientific explanations. 
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 The immense computational power that computers can bring to bear on the challenge of 
simulating natural phenomena has allowed researchers across the sciences to provide more how-
possibly explanations than ever before. A satisfactory rational reconstruction of scientific 
practices in the digital age should accommodate this practice of seeking to explain, via digital 
representation, facts about how various natural phenomena are possible. As I will show, extant 
accounts of how-possibly explanation do not accommodate this practice. Moreover, they fail to 
accurately characterize the function of how-possibly explanations in general. In this chapter, I 
offer an examination of the explanatory function of how-possibly simulations that sheds light on 
the way that how-possibly explanations work more generally. On the basis of this examination, I 
develop and argue for a new account of how-possibly explanations. 
 In Sections 2 and 3, I present the simple toy case and the case study from ornithology. In 
Section 4, I examine two existing accounts of how-possibly explanation and critique their ability 
to capture the explanatory achievements of how-possibly simulations. In Section 5, I present and 
argue for my own account of how-possibly explanations. It is central to my account that how-
possibly explanations are given in the face of an inability to imagine how some state of affairs is 
possible. Thus, an important and overlooked feature of how-possibly explanations is their 
success at relieving imaginative frustration. Because computer simulations are such powerful 
tools for expanding scientists' imaginative capacities, they are uniquely well-suited to furnish 
how-possibly explanations.  
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2. Demonstrating Possibility Versus Explaining How-Possibly: A Basketball Tale 
 
 Before I can argue for the role that how-possibly simulations play, it is important to 
distinguish explaining how-possibly from a related, but simpler achievement. A familiar 
distinction made by philosophers of science writing about why-actually explanations is the 
distinction between a justification for believing something and an explanation of why something 
is true, and a major challenge facing those who seek to give an account of scientific explanation 
is to identify the difference between these two achievements. Naturally, an analogous distinction 
arises in the case of explaining how-possibly. There is a difference between a mere 
demonstration that something is possible and an explanation of how something is possible. A 
demonstration that p is possible is anything that justifies someone's belief that p is possible. It 
could be a proof, an argument that falls short of a proof, or expert testimony, for example. A 
how-possibly explanation will always involve a demonstration of a possibility, but it does more. 
Consider the following illustrative story:  
Two UNC basketball fans, Sara and Kate, are watching a game between UNC and 
Duke. There are 9 seconds left in the game, and UNC is down by 7 points. During 
the final timeout of the game, Sara hangs her head in despair and declares “It's 
impossible for us to win.” “That's not true!” Kate protests. Now, imagine two ways 
the story could progress from this point: 
 
(1) Kate continues, “In 1995, Reggie Miller scored 8 points in 9 seconds to lead 
the Indiana Pacers to a victory over the New York Knicks.” Kate is a very reliable 
source of information from the history of sports, so Sara believes that what she 
reports is true. Sara knows that the rules of basketball in the NBA in 1995 were 
very similar to the rules of NCAA basketball in 2016, so she surmises that a series 
of plays that occurred in the Pacers game is probably also possible in the UNC 
game she is watching. She now believes that it is possible for UNC to win the 
game, even though she can't envision a sequence of plays that would secure the 
victory.  
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(2) Kate takes out her smartphone and shows Sara a video of Reggie Miller scoring 
8 points in 9 seconds to lead the Indiana Pacers to a victory over the New York 
Knicks in Game One of the 1995 Eastern Conference Semifinal. In the video, 
Miller makes a 3-point shot. Then, he intercepts the inbound pass and makes 
another 3-point shot. A Knicks player is fouled, and after he misses both of his free 
throw attempts, possession goes to the Pacers. Another Pacers player shoots and 
misses, and Miller is fouled attempting to rebound the shot. He makes both free 
throws, thereby completing the 8-point sequence in 8.9 seconds.” Impressed by the 
video, Sara now sees how it is possible for UNC to win the game. 
 
In the first scenario, Kate has demonstrated to Sara that it is possible for UNC to win the game. 
She has given her information on the basis of which Sara justifiedly infers that UNC might win 
the game. In the second scenario, Kate has done something more. She has succeeded in 
explaining to Sara how it is possible for UNC to win the game. I will refer back to this toy case 
to illustrate my account of how-possibly explanations.  
 As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting several striking features of this toy case. First, 
notice that Sara remains at a loss in a particular way once the possibility has been demonstrated 
to her in the first scenario, but she is not at any such loss once Kate has explained to her how the 
win is possible in the second scenario. I will consider what the difference between the two 
scenarios amounts to in Section 4. Second, notice the naturalness of the expression “Sara now 
sees how it is possible” in this context. This language of “seeing how” is a familiar shorthand for 
a kind of mental representation that I explore further when I develop my positive account of 
how-possibly explanation in Section 5.30 Third, once Kate has explained to Sara how the win is 
possible, Sara is in a position to easily envision variations on the scenario.31 She has a 
framework in mind that she can imagine being filled out in other ways. She might imagine the 
                                                 
30 I am relying on a visual metaphor with my use of “seeing how,” but I do not mean to suggest that there is 
anything essentially visual about such a mental representation.  
 
31 As with “seeing how,” I use the term “envision” merely as a visual metaphor for a kind of mental representation 
that need not be visual.  
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UNC play sequence omitting the detail of the missed shot before the shooter is fouled, for 
instance.  
 Finally, it bears mentioning that, even before speaking with Kate, Sara presumably 
understands that in some sense it is possible for UNC to win the game. She understands, for 
example, that if all of the Duke players were to sit down and refuse to play, UNC would easily 
win. There are contextual features that determine what counts as a possibility in the relevant 
sense. Sara isn't asking “how is it possible given any conceivable basketball outcome?” Rather, 
she is asking something more specific and more complicated. She is asking how it is possible, 
given a variety of factors she is holding fixed.32 For example, she is holding fixed that Duke will 
continue to make a competent effort to prevent UNC from winning. These factors are, at least for 
the most part, tacitly understood by Kate, and this enables her to explain how it is possible in the 
relevant sense.  
 In any case of explaining how-possibly, there will be contextual features that determine 
what counts as a possibility in the sense at hand. This is a familiar idea in the literature on 
possibility. When someone employs the term 'possible' (or 'impossible'), the speaker's meaning is 
informed by the fact that she is holding certain facts about the world fixed. What counts as a 
possibility in each case depends on what is held fixed in that particular context. David Lewis 
                                                 
32 Notice also that the operative sense of “possibility” in this case does not shift diachronically or between the 
dialogue participants in a way that hinders the success of the explanation. We might imagine a case in which 
someone believes a state of affairs is impossible because of some tacitly accepted background beliefs, at least 
one of which is false. If someone later provides her with information that reveals that the state of affairs is 
possible by showing her that one of the beliefs that informed the relevant sense of possibility is false, this is a 
different achievement than the one I am focusing on in this chapter. Imagine, as an example, that a student 
falsely believes it is impossible for her to pass a test because she is unable to answer half of the questions and 
she believes that her professor's grading policy require a score of at least 60% for a passing grade. If the 
professor then informs her that the lowest passing grade for the test is a 40%, she has received information that 
changes the operative sense of “possibility,” and she will reasonably abandon her belief that passing the test is 
impossible for her. Such a correction of one's background beliefs – while it may naturally be described as 
explaining how something is possible in colloquial terms – is not a how-possibly explanation, according my 
view.  
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famously illustrated this point with his example of whether it is possible for someone to speak 
Finnish (1976, p. 150). If the person's knowledge of languages is held fixed, his speaking Finnish 
does not count as a possibility (because he has not learned the language); but if only his 
physiological features are held fixed, speaking Finnish does count as a possibility (because his 
larynx, nervous system, etc. are functional). In a successful case of explaining how-possibly, the 
explainer must in some sense hone in on what the person requesting a how-possibly explanation 
is holding fixed, and thus what sort of scenario would count as a possibility in the relevant sense. 
In the basketball case, Kate realizes that Sara is holding fixed the continued perseverance of the 
Duke players, and thus her explanation of how it is possible for UNC to win must also hold this 
fact fixed.  
 All of the features of the simple toy case of explaining how-possibly that I have 
mentioned here have analogues in the case from scientific practice that I present in the next 
section, and each represents an important feature of how-possibly explanation.  
 
3. Case Study: Boids 
 
 The flocking of birds is a familiar but little understood natural occurrence. The question 
of how birds manage to form seemingly synchronized and organized formations when they travel 
in groups has long been an object of curiosity for scientists, and many avenues for learning about 
the cause of this phenomenon have been pursued since the early days of natural philosophy.33 
Over the past 50 years or so, this investigation has relied on participation from biologists, 
physicists, mathematicians, and computer scientists; contributions continue to be needed from 
                                                 
33 For a historical overview of research in bird flocking, see Parrish and Hamner (1997). 
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each of these groups in order to make further progress.34 While it is obvious that bird flocking 
falls under the scope of the life sciences, it is perhaps more surprising that the study of bird 
flocking has been aided in large part by work outside of the biological sciences. As two leading 
researchers in the field put it, “advances in the understanding of the function and mechanisms of 
organized flight have been strongly linked to the introduction of new techniques or technologies” 
(Bajec and Happner 2009, p. 786). The introduction of increasingly sophisticated computer 
simulation techniques, in particular, has been responsible for major bursts of progress in the 
study of bird flock formation. 
 The object of study in this research project is precisely defined by its investigators. A 
flock of birds, unlike an uncoordinated aggregation of birds, is “a group of flying birds, 
coordinated in one or more of the following parameters of flight: turning, spacing, velocity, flight 
direction of individual birds, and time of takeoff and landing” (Heppner 1974, p. 160). The 
particular category of birds of interest in the present case study is cluster flocks, as opposed to 
line flocks or flocks in which birds fly in a familiar “V” formation.35 The birds that form cluster 
flocks are typically small birds like blackbirds, robins, and starlings.  
 In his influential 1987 paper introducing a simple computer simulation of bird flocking, 
computer animator Craig Reynolds writes the following about the phenomenon of interest: 
The motion of a flock of birds is one of nature's delights. Flocks and related 
synchronized group behaviors such as schools of fish or herds of land animals are 
both beautiful to watch and intriguing to contemplate. A flock exhibits many 
contrasts. It is made up of discrete birds yet overall motion seems fluid; it is 
simple in concept yet is so visually complex, it seems randomly arrayed and yet is 
magnificently synchronized. Perhaps most puzzling is the strong impression of 
intentional, centralized control. (p. 25) 
                                                 
34 For a discussion of the contemporary state of bird flocking research, see Bajec and Heppner (2009). 
 
35 For a taxonomy of bird flock formations types, see Heppner (1974).  
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This passage identifies several of the puzzling features that have long perplexed biologists 
studying bird flocks.36 Though Reynolds' primary aim in simulating flock formations was not to 
aid biological research, he managed to disrupt some presumptions about bird flocking that had 
long constrained the set of hypotheses investigated by biologists.  
 Most significantly, Reynolds managed to refute the presumption that there must be a 
leader bird in cluster flock formations.37 Before computer simulations were deployed to 
investigate bird flocking, a common presumption by ornithologists was that much of the flock 
organization typically observed in birds must be the result of some bird serving as the leader of 
the flock.38 More recently, the question of whether bird flocks are in some sense centrally 
controlled has been the subject of a tremendous amount of research in biology. Iztok Bajec and 
Frank Heppner put the question this way: “Is there a leader in the flock who communicates an 
action intention in some fashion to other members of the flock, or is there some emergent 
property of flocking itself that produces coordinated movement?” (2009, p. 783).39 Nowadays, 
biologists who study birds flocking in cluster formations operate under the presumption that the 
latter scenario is a possibility worth investigating, but this has not always been the case. 
Regardless of the specific hypothesis a particular researcher takes the evidence to support most 
strongly, it is a nearly universal presumption among researchers investigating bird flocking that it 
                                                 
36 Notably, the boids model – with some variations -- also works well at simulating movements of schools of fish, 
herds of land animals, and other group motions. For further discussion of these other applications of the boids 
simulation, see Okubo (1986) and Flake (1998). 
 
37 In addition to refuting this modal supposition with his boids simulation, Reynolds also provided some evidence 
for the non-modal claim that birds flock leaderlessly. This confirmatory function of the simulation is 
simultaneous with its how-possibly explanatory function. 
 
38 For further discussion of this prevailing presumption, see Parrish and Hamner (1997, p.76). 
 
39 In context, Bajec and Heppner seem to be relying on some intuitive notion of what an “emergent property” is 
here, rather than using it as a technical philosophical term. 
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is at least possible for the cluster flock formations they observe in nature to occur without some 
particular bird serving as the flock's leader.  
 Before scientists realized that leaderless flocking was possible, the presumption that there 
must be a leader bird informed their theorizing in clear ways. For example, one of the major 
questions that motivated flocking research in the 1960s and 1970s was the question of how 
leader birds managed to coordinate their groups. Both visual models and auditory models of 
flock leadership faced clear challenges, especially given that neither model seemed likely to be 
accurate in particularly large flocks (where birds on the periphery would likely be unable to see 
or hear the leader). These challenges motivated the development of highly speculative and 
seemingly far-fetched theories about the way leaders communicate with their flocks. For 
example, in 1970, physicist Aleksandr Presman hypothesized that flock organization may be the 
result of a leader bird sending a signal to other birds in the flock by generating a weak 
electromagnetic field. Presman's hypothesis received significant uptake among biologists; in a 
1974 paper, biologists Frank Heppner and John Haffner offered a detailed defense of the 
electromagnetic field communication hypothesis as an explanation of field data. Notably, before 
investigating the hypothesis, Heppner and Haffner briefly considered the possibility that flocks 
are leaderless, but they judged that such a model of bird flocking “assumes mechanisms that go 
far beyond any evidence at the present time” (p. 152). They prefaced their investigation thus: “it 
will be assumed that a leader(s) exists in the flock, and we wish to discover what medium of 
communication most closely accounts for the observed behavior of the flock” (p. 152). 
 Biologists generally continued to build their theories of flock formation upon the 
presumption that there must be a leader bird until the mid-1980s, when a development in the 
computer simulation of bird flocking dramatically altered the landscape of bird flock formation 
53 
 
research. This development was the aforementioned computer simulation technique introduced 
by Craig Reynolds (1987).40 Reynolds, a computer animator, was motivated by the need for “a 
better approach... for efficient, robust, and believable animation of flocks and related group 
motions” (1987, p. 25). The program Reynolds authored for simulating flocking behavior was 
not especially complex, but it proved to be incredibly useful to both computer animators like 
himself and to biologists. The simulated birds, which he called “boids,” operated on simple rules 
and eventually formed flocks that bore a high degree of resemblance to flocks observed in the 
wild. Reynolds' boids simulation did not include the presumption of a leader bird. Rather, he 
assumed from the outset that all birds were operating on the same set of simple rules, with no 
bird playing a leader role (p. 25). This omission of a leader bird requirement was not a 
theoretically motivated choice. Rather, Reynolds avoided programming his boids with such a 
constraint because scripting each boid's path as an attempt to follow a designated leader was not 
an efficient means of animating flocks. Doing so would have required more time and more 
complicated code. 
 Reynolds started by developing a computer  program that depicted “simple geometric 
flight,” and he programmed the boids to behave in ways that implemented three simple rules 
(1987, p. 28). The first rule the boids followed was collision avoidance, which simply required 
them to “avoid collisions with nearby flockmates” (p. 28). The second rule was velocity 
matching, according to which the boids attempted to “match velocity with nearby flockmates” 
(p. 28). The third rule, flock centering, instructed boids to “attempt to stay close to nearby 
                                                 
40 Though Reynolds' boids simulation has perhaps been most influential, it is worth noting that other scholars 
began employing computer simulations of bird flocking around the same time, with similar success. Working 
independently, Okubo (1986) and Heppner and Grenander (1990) also developed computer simulations that 
posited leaderless flocking mechanisms.  
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flockmates” (p. 28). Each of the three rules gives the boid a steering suggestion, called an 
“acceleration request,” and each acceleration request has an associated strength – a fractional 
value between 0 and 1 (p. 29). The simulation implements a priority system, which is a function 
mapping from the acceleration requests on an individual boid to a resultant vector that guides the 
boid’s behavior. The vector instruction needs to be within the range of what is physically 
possible for the boid.41 To run an instance of the simulation, Reynolds started with a collection of 
boids randomly placed, ran iterations of the program, and observed the formations that arose. 
The success of the simulation was determined by the fact that “many people who view these 
animated flocks immediately recognize them as a representation of a natural flock, and find them 
similarly delightful to watch” (p. 26). 
 Though his primary aim in developing the boids model was to make computer animations 
of bird flocks more realistic, Reynolds notes the following about the potential value of the model 
for the life sciences: 
One serious application would be to aid in the scientific investigation of flocks, 
herds, and schools. These scientists must work almost exclusively in the 
observational mode; experiments with natural flocks and schools are difficult to 
perform and are likely to disturb the behaviors under study. It might be possible, 
using a more carefully crafted model of the realistic behavior of a certain species of 
bird, to perform controlled and repeatable experiments with “simulated natural 
flocks.” A theory of flock organization can be unambiguously tested by 
implementing a distributed behavioral model and simply comparing the aggregate 
motion of the simulated flock with the natural one. (1987, p. 32)  
  
                                                 
41  Reynolds' simulation implements a strict priority ordering of all the acceleration requests. Each boid has a fixed 
magnitude of acceleration, and each request has a fractional magnitude. In some cases, the strength of the highest 
priority acceleration request is so great that it exhausts the magnitude of acceleration available to the boid, and 
none of the other requests are satisfied (p. 29). Reynolds provides as one example a case in which “the flock 
centering urge could be correctly ignored temporarily in favor of a maneuver to avoid a static obstacle” (p. 29). 
In other words, in the boids simulation, collision avoidance is strictly higher in the priority ranking than flock 
centering. 
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This is exactly what many biologists did in the wake of Reynolds' work. Prior to Reynolds' 
simulation, the hypothesis that flocking was leaderless was not taken seriously by scientists. In 
light of his simulation work, scientists were newly able to see existing data as consistent with 
(and in some cases even evidence for) the hypothesis that flocks are leaderless. That is, they were 
able to see how it was possible for birds to flock leaderlessly. The presumption that there must be 
a leader was largely abandoned, and researchers who once presupposed the existence of a flock 
leader in their models began to explore the hypothesis that flocks are leaderless.  
 For example, in 1992, Harold Pomeroy and Frank Heppner conducted a study of the ways 
in which birds change positions in cluster flock formations that they took to provide evidence 
against the hypothesis that flocks have leader birds. They found that the flight paths of individual 
rock doves often crossed through the flock so that a bird who had been in the front of the flock 
would transition to the back of the flock, and vice versa. They noted that this is not what you 
would expect on a leadership model. Heppner had been a leading researcher in the 1974 study 
cited above that considered the possibility that bird flocking was the result of a leader bird 
sending signals to flockmates by generating a weak electromagnetic field. Having once 
presupposed the existence of a flock leader, Heppner now took the observational data to provide 
evidence against the hypothesis that there was a flock leader. 
 Contemporary behavioral biologists continue to develop strategies for testing the simple 
rules from Reynolds' boids simulation, as well as other leaderless flock models that have been 
proposed in recent decades, against more and more sophisticated sets of data.42 Other computer 
scientists have augmented the boids model to great success. For example, Gary William Flake 
adapted Reynolds' original boids model to apply it to flock formations other than cluster flocks 
                                                 
42 See for example Ballerini et al (2008) and Heppner and Grenander (1990). 
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(1998). He did this by adding a rule instructing boids to move laterally away from any other boid 
that blocked their view (p. 271). Once he added this rule, Flake found that the largest cluster of 
boids in the simulation formed something that approximates the “V” formation that is famously 
observed in migratory flocks formed by larger bird species such as geese and ducks (p. 275). 
This successful extension of the boids program was roundly treated as confirmation for both the 
hypothesis that flocks do not have leader birds, and the hypothesis furnished by Reynolds' boids 
model in particular. 
 Computer simulations of flocking birds have explained how it is possible for familiar 
flock formations to occur without any bird serving as a leader, both in cluster flocks and in other 
formations. This computational achievement has altered the landscape of bird flocking research 
in biology and the associated life sciences. Heppner and Bajec reflect on this development: 
In the 1970s, there was no conceptual alternative to a leadership model for 
producing simultaneous or near-simultaneous turning movements in cluster 
flocks. With the advent of the many models that treat flocks as collections of 
independently acting agents that produce turning movements as the product of 
individual movement, a viable alternative to leadership models now exists. 
(2009, p. 786) 
 
This achievement of the boids simulation, which Heppner and Bajec refer to as the development 
of a viable “conceptual alternative” to the leadership model, is a part of the achievement I am 
focusing on in this chapter. Of course, this simulation performs the familiar function of 
confirming the hypothesis it introduces, but its confirmatory role is not the only respect in which 
it has scientific value. I will argue that the boids simulation and its descendants have a value for 
bird flocking research that comes from their success at enabling scientists to correct for a failure 
of imagination. This will be captured by one of the necessary conditions for how-possibly 
explanations that I provide in Part 5. 
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4. Explaining How-Possibly 
 
 In this section, I will examine two existing accounts of how-possibly explanation and 
evaluate them using both the boids case and the basketball case. Philosophers writing about how-
possibly explanation have typically not clearly identified what they take the explanans and the 
explanandum to be in a successful case of explaining how-possibly. The explanations I am 
calling how-possibly explanations are all naturally understood as seeking to explain facts of the 
form “It is possible that p” (where p is some state of affairs). Because all facts of this form are 
modal facts, I will take as a starting point for developing my account that the explanandum of a 
how-possibly explanation is a modal fact. The motivation for identifying the explanandum with a 
modal fact is that, in any successful case of how-possibly explanation, the natural answer to the 
question of what was explained will be something modal. In the basketball case, the most 
obvious answers to the question of what Kate explained to Sara are “how it was possible for 
UNC to win” and “that it was possible for UNC to win.” There is no natural answer to this 
question that does not invoke a modal fact. The answer cannot, of course, be that Kate explained 
to Sara how UNC actually won the game because (1) the game is not over at the time Sara 
receives the explanation, and (2) the success of the how-possibly explanation relies neither on 
UNC actually winning the game in the way Kate identifies nor on UNC winning the game at all. 
 As I mentioned above, a how-possibly explanation is importantly different from a mere 
demonstration of the fact that a state of affairs is possible. For example, the boids simulation 
explains the fact that it is possible for birds to form cluster flocks without any bird serving as a 
leader, and it could still manage to do so even for someone who was already convinced by a 
demonstration of this fact that leaderless flocking is possible (for example, someone who is 
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shown the simulation and informed that it is leaderless, but not informed about the three rules 
that give rise to the flock-like formations).43 Though I have identified the explanandum of a 
how-possibly explanation, it is less straightforward what serves as the explanans. In many cases, 
a depiction of some sort (e.g. a diagram, a video, a computer simulation, a script, etc.) will give 
rise to the how-possibly explanation. I will call this useful depiction a simulacrum. While these 
simulacra often play important roles in successful instances of how-possibly explanation, it is not 
obvious that the role they play is that of explanantia. However, before fully investigating the role 
played by these simulacra, it will be useful to take a look at some extant accounts of the 
phenomenon of explaining how-possibly.  
 Several philosophers of science have offered accounts of how-possibly explanations.44 In 
this section, I will assess two of these accounts. While these accounts are helpful in bringing out 
some of the features of how-possibly explanations, each of them leaves out much of what I take 
to be the cognitive value of how-possibly explanations. This is made particularly clear by the fact 
that they do not capture the explanatory function of the boids simulation or the basketball case. 
  
 4.1 Dray's Account 
 
 William Dray is the philosopher of science typically credited with first identifying and 
describing the category of how-possibly explanations (Dray 1957). He differentiates how-
possibly explanations from what he calls “why-necessarily” explanations, the more familiar kind 
                                                 
43 The question of what relevant background beliefs inform the sense of possibility operative in this explanandum 
naturally arises. It strikes me as reasonable to surmise that the contextually-determined sense of possibility in 
this case is informed by expectations about the complexity of bird cognition and the apparent complexity of 
cluster flock formations, as well as beliefs about what is physically possible for birds, given their anatomy.  
 
44 See for example, Dray 1957, Brandon 1990, and Forber 2010. 
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of scientific explanation that philosophers discuss (what I referred to above as “why-actually” 
explanations).45 46 In doing so, he identifies several features of how-possibly explanations. I will 
examine the two features he offers as necessary conditions for how-possibly explanations and 
argue that both conditions are mistaken, though they are both in the neighborhood of an 
important necessary condition for explaining how-possibly. For each, I will offer a replacement 
condition that better characterizes what occurs in a how-possibly explanation.  
 The first crucial feature that Dray identifies is a relationship between the epistemic state 
of a person who doubts that is possible for some state of affairs to obtain and the how-possibly 
explanation that is presented to her. For ease of discussion, I will refer to the person who is the 
beneficiary of a how-possibly explanation as a skeptic.47 Dray claims that “the essential feature 
of explaining how-possibly is ...that [the explanation] is given in the face of a certain sort of 
puzzlement,” and that these explanations serve to rebut a presumption that some state of affairs 
was impossible (1957, p. 165-166). So, on Dray's account, the skeptic supposes that a state of 
affairs is impossible, and is in a state of puzzlement as a result. In a successful instance of a how-
possibly explanation, that puzzlement must be somehow resolved. 
 While Dray's characterization of how-possibly explanations as essentially resolving a 
state of puzzlement may capture what goes on in some cases of how-possibly explanations, it is 
                                                 
45 Dray's purpose in discussing how-possibly explanations is to show that they are a set of counterexamples to 
Hempel's covering law account of scientific explanation. He claims that Hempel's covering law model cannot 
account for how-possibly explanations because they do not cite laws and they need not be arguments for their 
explananda (1957, p. 168). 
 
46 A why-necessarily explanation here could be a covering law explanation, or a causal explanation, or perhaps one 
of the other types of explanations that scientists and philosophers of science recognize as why-actually 
explanations of physical states of affairs. Why-necessarily explanations (as conceived of by Dray) may come 
apart from why-actually explanations if statistical explanations can be why-actually explanations because it 
would be unnatural to call a statistical explanation a “why-necessarily” explanation. 
 
47 For reasons I will provide later in this section, my usage of the term “skeptic” is not philosophically standard. 
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not true that all cases of how-possibly explanation involve puzzlement. In the basketball case, 
Sara's claim that it is impossible for UNC to win may or may not result from an unresolved 
puzzlement. As I described the case, the matter is not settled. All that is clear is that she is at a 
loss to envision how UNC could win. However, in the boids case, a feeling of puzzlement is 
ostensibly lacking among the scientists for whom the simulation furnishes a how-possibly 
explanation. It is clear that they were unable to envision a way that birds might flock without a 
leader, but there is no evidence that they experienced an attendant puzzlement. Recall that 
Heppner and Haffner set aside the possibility of leaderless flocking because they took it to 
“[assume] mechanisms that go far beyond any evidence” (1974, p. 152). I take this comment to 
reflect an inability to imagine how their evidence (observations of birds flocking) could be 
consistent with any story that did not involve a leader bird. This inability to imagine a leaderless 
system consistent with their observations sets them up as candidate recipients of a how-possibly 
explanation, whether or not they experienced any puzzlement. If the basketball case and the 
boids case are paradigm cases of how-possibly explanation, as I take them to be, then Dray's 
claim that a how-possibly explanation requires a skeptic to be in a state of puzzlement is not true.  
 It is true of both the basketball case and the boids case that the skeptic is unable to 
imagine how the state of affairs in question could obtain. In place of Dray's puzzlement 
condition, then, I will adopt the condition that a how-possibly explanation must be given in the 
face of an inability to imagine how some state of affairs could obtain.48 Sometimes this inability 
will be accompanied by a belief that the state of affairs is impossible, and sometimes it will not. 
                                                 
48 It is worth noting that an imaginative inability is not a unique feature of how-possibly explanations. Philosophers 
of science writing about explanation generally have also observed that explanation is called for in the face of 
such an imaginative inability, and often an attendant puzzlement. See, for example, Grimm 2008. 
61 
 
Sometimes this inability will be accompanied by puzzlement, but the puzzlement in such cases is 
only a symptom of the inability and not itself a necessary feature of how-possibly explanation.    
 At this point, it is important to note that my use of the term “skeptic” in these cases is not 
philosophically standard because the recipient of a how-possibly explanation need not be 
skeptical about the truth of the modal fact that is being explained to her. In fact, in some cases, 
the person I am referring to as a skeptic may have been fully convinced that the state of affairs in 
question is possible before coming to really see how it is possible. This is true of Sara in scenario 
1. She believes, on the basis of Kate's expert testimony, that it is possible for UNC to win the 
game, but she remains in need of a how-possibly explanation. On my use of the term, she still 
counts as a skeptic because she is unable to envision how the state of affairs is possible, and is 
therefore eligible to receive a how-possibly explanation.  
 Thus, in order for someone to be an eligible recipient of a how-possibly explanation on 
my view, she neither needs to experience puzzlement nor needs to believe that the state of affairs 
is impossible, as Dray implies. Rather, it must be the case only that she cannot see how it is 
possible for the state of affairs in question to obtain.  
 Dray identifies a second necessary condition for a how-possibly explanation: the relief of 
a logical tension between the possibility to be explained and the beliefs that prompt a 
presumption of impossibility. To see what he means, it is worth considering the following simple 
example that he presents to illustrate his notion of explaining how-possibly: 
Suppose that a person is told that the resort he is in the habit of visiting each year 
has been destroyed by an avalanche. 'That's impossible!' he may protest; “There's 
never enough snow on those hills to guarantee a decent day's skiing.' The sort of 
explanation required by this objector would include an account of the 
unprecedentedly severe winter which preceded the disaster. Adding further facts 
to the stock he was working with would relieve the logical tension between what 
he already knows and what he is now asked to believe. His perfectly reasonable 
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presumption must be rebutted; he must be shown that there could have been an 
avalanche after all. (1957, p. 165) 
 
“What [one] already knows,” for Dray, seems to be the same as “the stock [of facts] [one is] 
working with,” or one's background beliefs. So the idea seems to be that a how-possibly 
explanation must be given in a context for which there is a logical contradiction between a 
skeptic's background beliefs and the possibility claim she is considering. Dray does not give a 
detailed account of just what it is for a how-possibly explanation to relieve such a logical 
tension, but I will attempt to elaborate what I take to be the most straightforward reading of his 
claim in order to evaluate this proposed necessary condition of explaining how-possibly.  
 In the avalanche scenario, the skeptic (whom Dray calls the “objector”) develops 
expectations based on his stock of background beliefs, and when these expectations contradict 
the claim about the state of affairs suggested to him – “the resort has been destroyed by an 
avalanche” – it is natural for him to respond with a presumption of impossibility. So, a how-
possibly explanation must somehow logically reconcile a proposition describing a state of affairs 
with a set of background beliefs that are in tension with that proposition so that the expectation 
of impossibility no longer arises. The logical tension in the avalanche case is between the claim 
there was an avalanche at the resort and the presumptions that gave rise to the expectation that it 
is not possible for there to be an avalanche at the resort. From context, those presumptions seem 
to include the false belief that the snowfall at the resort never exceeds some modest amount. 
Once the skeptic is disabused of this false belief, his background belief set no longer gives rise to 
the presumption that it is impossible for there to be an avalanche at the resort. Moreover, perhaps 
this false belief was responsible for preventing him from imagining an avalanche at the resort, 
and he may now be able to envision for himself how an avalanche might occur there. So, in some 
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cases of successful how-possibly explanation, correcting a false belief on the part of the skeptic 
is enough to correct for the failure of imagination that prevents the skeptic from seeing how the 
state of affairs in question could occur.  
 I take this to be a plausible description of how the how-possibly explanation in the 
avalanche story. However, though the relief of a logical tension may well be central to this story, 
I will argue that Dray's 'relief of a logical tension' condition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for explaining how-possibly. It is not sufficient because there are familiar instances in 
which someone may be fully convinced that the situation in question is possible, and yet still 
require a how-possibly explanation. These constitute a category of cases I discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter – demonstrations of possibility that are not also how-possibly 
explanations. Basketball scenario (1) is one such case. Recall that in this case, Kate has given 
Sara enough information to justify Sara's belief that it is possible for UNC to win the game. She 
has not, however, enabled Sara to see for herself how it is possible. Relieving a logical tension is 
also not necessary for explaining how-possibly, because there are some cases of how-possibly 
explanations in which the skeptic does not take there to be a logical contradiction between the 
possibility claim she is asked to believe and her background beliefs. Imagine that after Kate 
succeeds in demonstrating this possibility to Sara, she goes on to show her the video and thereby 
explain to her how it is possible for UNC to win the game. In this case, Kate has explained to her 
how it was possible for UNC to win without relieving a logical tension. Sara already believed, on 
the basis of Kate's prior demonstration, that it was possible for UNC to win the game. She 
progressed from merely believing that the win was possible to seeing how it was possible, and no 
part of this progression involved the relief of a logical tension. So, the relief of a logical tension 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining how-possibly. However, I suspect 
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that when the skeptic does believe that the state of affairs in question is impossible, Dray is right 
that a logical tension must be relieved.  
 While I will not take on board Dray's relief-of-a-logical-tension condition in my account 
of explaining how-possibly, I will take on a related condition.49 This condition is the relief of an 
imaginative frustration. In my analysis of Dray's avalanche case above, I mentioned the skeptic 
being newly able to envision the avalanche at the resort once the how-possibly explanation goes 
through. I take this feature to be characteristic of explaining how-possibly, but it is left out of 
Dray's account. Even in cases where Dray's condition holds and the how-possibly explanation 
features the relief of a logical tension, this additional feature of the explanation event seems to be 
doing more of the explanatory work. The value of relieving a logical tension in the avalanche 
case is that it enables the skeptic to envision (i.e. form a mental representation of) a scenario he 
was previously unable to imagine. And this feature is shared with the other cases of how-possibly 
explanation I have discussed so far: the basketball case and the boids case. I will elaborate 
further on this relief of an imaginative frustration condition in Section 5.  
 One might object that in all of these cases, a logical tension is alleviated: the tension 
between the supposition that the situation in question is impossible and the claim that it is 
possible. While this may be right, this is not the sort of relief of a logical tension that Dray 
identified. Dray relied on the notion that there was a logical tension between the stock of one's 
background beliefs and a claim that a situation is possible. If a supposition of impossibility does 
not follow from the skeptic's background beliefs, this would not seem to fit with Dray's account. 
                                                 
49 It is possible, of course, that Dray would not object to my replacing his relief of a logical tension condition with 
my relief of an imaginative frustration condition. Perhaps, rather than meaning to refer to a logical tension in the 
philosophical sense of “logical”, Dray meant to appeal to some more generic sense of rational reconciliation. In 
this case, he may have had in mind something relevantly like the imaginative frustration I am describing.  
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In both the explanatory basketball case (scenario 2) and the boids case, the presumption of 
impossibility seems to result from the set of scenarios that the relevant party is able to envision. 
If none of them is consistent with the state of affairs in question, it is natural to suppose – as 
though by default – that the state of affairs in question is impossible. The prevailing expectation 
among scientists studying bird flocking before the boids simulation was introduced was that 
cluster flocks could not display such a high degree of organization without a leader bird. While it 
is not clear precisely what features of the stock of background beliefs shared by these scientists 
gave rise to these expectations, it is abundantly clear that this was the state of things. Upon being 
confronted with a simple computer simulation depicting leaderless flocking, scientists were able 
to add a scenario to the mental stock of possible flocking mechanisms they could envision, and 
this resolved the tension between their expectations and the claim that leaderless flocking is 
possible. In the basketball case, it is likewise unclear just what gave rise to Sara's supposition of 
impossibility. Upon seeing Kate's video, Sara is able to add the scenario to her mental stock of 
plausible play sequences, and this alleviates the imaginative frustration she experiences when she 
attempts to envision a UNC victory. In all three of these cases, the explanatory work seems to be 
done by the skeptic's being able to imagine something she was unable to imagine previously.  
 I want to guard against an objection to my description here. One might argue that, in 
these two cases, it is merely that the skeptic has the false belief that the scenarios they have 
considered exhaust the possibilities, and the how-possibly explanation serves to refute this false 
belief. However, this is not a psychologically plausible picture in either the basketball case or the 
bird flocking case. Sara certainly does not believe that she has in mind every scenario that could 
transpire in a college basketball game, and she does not need such a belief to naturally suppose 
that it is impossible for UNC to win the game. In the bird flocking case, the scientists clearly do 
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not think they have considered all of the possible ways that birds could flock. The very enterprise 
Heppner and Haffner are engaged in when they dismiss from serious consideration the possibility 
that birds flock without a leader indicates that they do not think they have considered all of the 
possible ways that birds could flock. They are, after all, attempting to flesh out a sketchy and 
speculative scenario (that birds flock as a result of a leader communicating changes in the 
electromagnetic field) in order to get a new hypothesis on the table. The creative enterprise of 
developing theories is not one a scientist would undertake if she had the belief that she was 
already aware of all of the possibilities for the mechanism underlying the system in question.  
 Notably, as the contrast between the basketball case and the boids case illustrates, how-
possibly explanations can be either purposeful or inadvertent. Kate was purposeful in explaining 
to Sara how it was possible for UNC to win, while Reynolds' successful how-possibly 
explanation was inadvertent. Both sorts appear to be commonplace in scientific practice.50  
 It is the nature of the inability to envision how something could obtain that I mentioned 
above that gives rise to the presumption of impossibility in cases for which a how-possibly 
explanation is called for. This inability could come from a false belief that prevents the skeptic 
from envisioning a possible scenario (as in Dray's avalanche case), or it could be a failure of 
imagination that is not merely attributable to any particular false belief (as in both the basketball 
                                                 
50 Purposeful how-possibly explanation often occurs when a researcher sets out to dispute the claim that a theory 
cannot account for some data. See for instance the evolution of insect wings example discussed by Brandon 
(1990). He identifies a 1985 study by Joel Kingsolver and M.A.R. Koehl that he says is “a perfect example of a 
how-possibly explanation of an adaptation” (p. 180). These researchers sought to defend natural selection by 
refuting the supposition that insect wings could not have evolved according to the laws of evolutionary biology. 
They developed an account of how wings could have evolved by noting that protowings could have initially 
arisen for thermoregulatory purposes and later turned out to be aerodynamically advantageous. From that point, 
the appendages may have increased in size and changed in structure, even though those changes would not have 
helped with the original thermoregulatory function of the protowings, because they would have become useful 
for motion (p. 182). In offering this story, Kingsolver and Koehl explained how it is possible for insect wings to 
have evolved, given the laws of evolutionary biology they were antecedently committed to.  
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case and the boids case). In both cases, however, the relief of tension must involve the reformed 
skeptic being newly able to envision, imagine, or in some other way mentally represent how the 
scenario in question could transpire. This feature is at the heart of my account of the cognitive 
value of how-possibly explanations, and I will discuss it in further detail in the final section of 
this chapter.  
  
 4.2 Brandon's Account  
 
 Robert Brandon (1990) offers an account of how-possibly explanations that he considers 
to be an improvement upon Dray's account. Brandon argues that what Dray counts as a how-
possibly explanation is incomplete (p. 178). He mentions two additional features of how-possibly 
explanations that provide kernels of two necessary conditions for explaining how-possibly that I 
will include in my positive account. 
 Brandon describes what he takes to be a paradigm case of a how-possibly explanation: a 
passage from Chapter 6 of Darwin's On the Origin of Species entitled “Organs of Extreme 
Perfection and Complication” (1859). Darwin acknowledges that it initially seems absurd to 
suggest that an organ as complex and precise as the mammalian eye “could have been formed by 
natural selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 177). In doing so, he addresses a hypothetical skeptic who 
doubts that it is possible for an eye to evolve via natural selection because its function relies on 
so much complexity that a more primitive organ at a prior evolutionary stage could not have 
afforded any advantage. He then offers what Brandon refers to as a “speculative and incomplete” 
account of how the eye might have evolved from a pigment-coated optic nerve (1990, p. 177). 
Brandon thinks it is clear in this case that this account and others like it in evolutionary biology 
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have a “cognitive value independent of whether or not they reflect the way the trait actually 
evolved” (p.178). From this example, Brandon concludes that an account can explain how-
possibly it is the case that p even if it does not explain why-actually it is the case that p. In other 
words, a how-possibly explanation has a “truth-independent cognitive value.” Brandon does not 
elaborate in great detail on the nature of this cognitive value, but I agree with him that it is 
characteristic of how-possibly explanations that their success as explanations does not require 
that they be accurate descriptions of their target systems.  
 Darwin's theory of natural selection illustrates the importance of how-possibly 
explanations in science. It is precisely the capacity to give how-possibly explanations (such as 
the how-possibly explanation of the mammalian eye's evolution that Brandon references) that 
has been taken as evidence for the theory, even though most of the how-possibly explanations 
Darwin initially gave have subsequently been rejected as why-actually explanations. The primary 
scientific value of the theory of natural selection when Darwin introduced it was not its 
predictive power or its ability to furnish explanations of how traits actually evolved, but rather its 
ability to furnish a series of how-possibly explanations.51 Any philosophical account of the 
scientific value of the theory must therefore identify what it is to explain how something is 
possible.  
 Philip Kitcher's discussion of the explanatory value of Darwin's principle of Natural 
Selection reinforces the notion that how-possibly explanations need not be accurate descriptions 
of their target systems (1985). Kitcher argues that the value of Darwin's explanatory achievement 
in proposing Natural Selection transcends the truth of the explanations for particular observable 
                                                 
51 Darwin's theory of natural selection did offer some why-actually explanations as well (e.g. of the geographical 
distribution of species). See, for example Darwin (1859), Chapter XI. 
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phenomena that Darwin offers. Darwin has done much more than merely answer particular 
scientific why questions, and he has done much more than simply assert that phenomena should 
be explained in a certain way; he has provided “a demonstration of the form that the answers are 
to take” (p. 50). Specifically, Darwin showed that certain why-questions should be answered in a 
certain way, namely with a description of a lineage's history. The achievement of showing that a 
particular form of answer would succeed as an explanation is valuable even if it turns out that 
particular descriptions of a lineage's history turn out to be inaccurate.  
 Reflection on the toy cases I presented above also shows that a how-possibly 
explanation's success does not depend on whether the scenario depicted turns out to accurately 
represent the target system. For example, in the second basketball scenario, we would not say 
that Kate failed to successfully explain to Sara how it was possible for UNC to win if it turned 
out that UNC went on to lose, or to win the game in some radically different way than the one 
depicted in in Kate's video. Moreover, if scientists later discovered that bird flocks do have 
leader birds after all, the boids simulation would not cease to be an explanation of how it was 
possible, given the scientists' contextually-determined relevant background beliefs at the time, 
for birds to flock without a leader. We can assess the success of a how-possibly explanation 
without knowing the true details of the actual system. If for some reason the recipient of the 
explanation later became persuaded that the scenario she had been envisioning was not in fact 
possible, my verdict is that her previous mental representation of that scenario still counted as a 
how-possibly explanation at the time, though it would not any longer serve as a how-possibly 
explanation for her.  
 The second feature of how-possibly explanations identified by Brandon that I want to 
develop and take on board is the idea that how-possibly explanations are somehow potential 
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why-actually explanations. Brandon says they are “potential explanations, none of whose 
explanatory premises contradict or conflict with 'known facts' (i.e. the things we believe based on 
good evidence)” (p. 178-179).52 So in order to explain the fact that something is possible, how-
possibly explanations must be potential why-actually explanation in the sense that they depict 
epistemic possibilities from the perspective of the skeptic. In other words, at the time they are 
introduced they must not have already been ruled out as true from the perspective of the recipient 
of the explanation. Imagine, for instance, that Kate shows Sara the basketball video after the 
game, when Sara already knows that UNC managed to win the game by some means other than 
the play sequence depicted in the Pacers video. The video cannot furnish a potential why-actually 
explanation of the UNC win at that time, even though it is still true that, had the game progressed 
in the way the video identifies, it would have explained UNC's win. This is because once UNC 
has already won by some other means, the scenario depicted in the video is ruled out (for Sara) 
as an explanation of why they actually won.  
 Brandon's requirement that how-possibly explanations must be contender why-actually 
explanations means that whether something counts as a how-possibly explanation is an 
epistemically relative matter; it is relative to the state of knowledge of the recipient. Any putative 
how-possibly explanation's success can only be assessed relative to a particular audience in a 
particular context. Admittedly, epistemic relativity has historically been considered problematic 
as a feature of scientific explanation. Famously, Carl Hempel thought that inductive-statistical 
explanations were epistemically relative (Hempel 1965, p. 397), and this was widely considered 
a flaw of that account (Salmon 1989, pp. 70-74). I would like to suggest that epistemic relativity 
                                                 
52 I will assume that Brandon takes “known facts” to occupy roughly the same role in his account that background 
beliefs do in my account. I do not, however, have the requirement that the relevant background beliefs are held 
on the basis of good evidence. 
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is not a problem for how-possibly explanations, though it may be for why-actually explanations. 
On the account I will develop in the next section, it will be clear why what makes something a 
good how-possibly explanation is not entirely an objective, mind-independent matter.  
 It seems to me that, though Brandon's requirement does a nice job of capturing the 
explanatory power of how-possibly explanations, it does not fully capture the sense in which 
how-possibly explanations are potential why-actually explanations. How-possibly explanations 
must also be potential why-actually explanations in the sense that, were the contents of a how-
possibly explanation true, it could succeed in explaining why the state of affairs in question 
actually obtains.53 So, in the basketball case, this would mean that, if the UNC players carried 
out exactly the play sequence that the Pacers players carried out in the video Kate showed Sara, 
that would explain why UNC actually won. In the boids case, the idea would be that if birds 
actually flocked using the simple rules implemented in the program, that would explain the 
flocking patterns observed by scientists. This addition to Brandon's requirement captures the 
respect in which how-possibly explanations must be potential explanations of one sort and full-
fledged explanations of another sort. Thus, the requirement that how-possibly explanations be 
potential why-actually explanations is twofold. They must both depict epistemic possibilities for 
the recipient and depict scenarios that would explain the state of affairs in question, were those 
scenarios to obtain.  
 One might object to the first part of this twofold condition (Brandon's epistemic 
possibility requirement) that if Kate showed Sara the video after they had already witnessed 
UNC winning by some other means, Kate would still be furnishing a kind of how-possibly 
                                                 
53 This second sense of “potential explanations” was first suggested to me by Marc Lange. It is possible that 
Brandon would endorse this additional requirement, but he does not make this explicit.  
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explanation: an explanation of how else it would have been possible for UNC to win the game, 
had they not won it in the way they did. So, if UNC had won the game in the way depicted in the 
video, then that would have been a why-actually explanation of their winning the game. 
However, there is an important difference between this kind of explanation and the kind of 
explanation I am calling a how-possibly explanation. This kind of explanation does not resolve 
an imaginative frustration. Sara already knows that it was possible for UNC to win the game, and 
she can imagine at least one way in which it was possible (the actual way in which it happened). 
Thus, there is an important sense in which she does not need a how-possibly explanation.  
 Instead, this kind of explanation merely shows that the state of affairs in question could 
have obtained in another way. Therefore it plays a quite different, and more modest, role in 
enhancing Sara’s epistemic state. Instead of resolving an imaginative frustration and allowing 
Sara to see how the state of affairs in question was possible, this explanation only allows Sara to 
see that there was more than one way in which it could have obtained. Whether or not to call this 
more modest explanation a how-possibly explanation may be to some degree a verbal dispute, 
but because such explanations do not play the same epistemic role as the explanations I am 
discussing, I consider them another category of explanations altogether (perhaps we might call 
them how-else-possibly explanations). Importantly, the scientific cases that motivate my account 
of how-possibly explanations are cases for which both parts of the twofold requirement are 
constraints on the explanatory practice. I have shown that how-possibly explanations (on my 
account) play an important role in scientific practice; whether how-else-possibly explanations 
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play any important role in scientific practice is an interesting question that falls outside the scope 
of the present inquiry.54 
 
5. My Account of How-Possibly Explanations 
 
 In the previous section, I identified four necessary features of how-possibly explanations. 
I will summarize them here before going on to more fully develop the parts of my account that 
require further elaboration. (1) How-possibly explanations take as their explananda modal facts 
of the form “It is possible that p (given a set of contextually-determined relevant background 
beliefs).” (2) They must be given in the face of an inability to see how something is possible on 
the part of the skeptic, and they must alleviate that inability. (3) This alleviation must involve the 
relief of an imaginative frustration so that the skeptic is newly able to imagine how the state of 
affairs could occur (i.e. it must correct for a failure of imagination), given her background 
beliefs. (4) How-possibly explanations must be potential why-actually explanations in the 
following two senses: (a) they are contender why-actually explanations from the perspective of 
the skeptic at the time of their introduction, and (b) if their contents were true, they could 
succeed at explaining why the state of affairs in question obtains.  
 I need to explain in greater detail what is required by condition (3). In particular, I must 
say more about the sort of imaginative event in question. In doing so, I will identify what I take 
to be the explanans of a how-possibly explanation and explain how such explanantia relate to 
simulacra such as the basketball video and the boids simulation. Recall that a simulacrum is a 
                                                 
54 I owe this response to the objection to Keshav Singh.  
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depiction such as a diagram, video, computer simulation, or script that enables a skeptic to see 
how some state of affairs is possible. 
 The explanans of a how-possibly explanation must take the form of a mental 
representation.55 This mental representation must depict a state of affairs that the person 
demanding a how-possibly explanation was previously unable to imagine. This explanans itself 
is not a linguistic product, although it may (for many purposes) be adequately characterized in 
language. In many cases, a how-possibly explanation is furnished by some simulacrum that gives 
rise to the explanans by prompting a mental representation. This is clearly true in the basketball 
case and the boids case, though perhaps not in Dray's avalanche case. In the basketball case, 
Sara's experience of watching the video prompts her to form a mental representation of UNC 
performing a sequence of plays that would enable them to win the game. In the boids case, 
Reynolds' simulation prompted scientists to imagine a mechanism for the flocking of actual birds 
that did not rely on the presence of a leader. By contrast, in Dray's avalanche case, there may or 
may not be a simulacrum involved. The story is not developed in great enough detail for this to 
be determined. We can certainly imagine, for instance, that the resort-goer is offered a story 
about the avalanche that incorporates the relevant information about severe winter weather. In 
this case, that story would be the simulacrum. However, it is also possible, given Dray's 
explanation of the case, that the resort-goer is merely informed that there was unprecedentedly 
severe winter weather that year, in which case the removal of his false belief was sufficient to 
                                                 
55 By “explanans” here, I mean broadly “the thing that does the explaining.” I am departing here from the original 
Hempel and Oppenheim usage of the term to refer to “the class of those sentences which are adduced to account 
for the phenomenon” (1965, p. 247). As many philosophers of science have noted, the word “explain” is 
ambiguous between the communicative act and what is offered in that act (see, for example, Hempel 1965, p. 
413). I use the term “explanans” here in part to differentiate the subject of my inquiry from the communicative 
act. Insofar as the term “explanans” properly applies in a successful case of explaining how-possibly, it applies to 
the representation in the mind of the person who comes to understand how something is possible.  
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prompt his mental representation of the avalanche, with no simulacrum required. The 
simulacrum, in cases where it is present, is a device that allows the skeptic to recognize how a 
state of affairs is possible. However, the actual explanans is the mental representation that a 
person forms on the basis of the simulacrum.  
 An alternative candidate for the explanans is a proposition describing the state of affairs 
depicted by the simulacrum and deeming it possible. This would mean that, in the basketball 
case, the explanans would turn out to be a conjunction of propositions describing each event that 
occurs in the Pacers video, substituting in college players, and predicating possibility of the 
resulting state of affairs. So perhaps the explanans should be understood as the following 
proposition: It is possible that a UNC player makes a 3-point shot, then intercepts the inbound 
pass and makes another 3-point shot; then a Duke player is fouled, and after he misses both of 
his free throw attempts, possession goes to UNC; then a second UNC player shoots and misses, 
and the first UNC player is fouled attempting to rebound the shot; and finally the first UNC 
player makes both free throws, thereby completing the 8-point sequence in 8.9 seconds. A 
defender of this candidate explanans might argue that, if Sara truly understood the proposition 
(or perhaps if she truly understood a sufficiently detailed proposition along these lines), she 
could not fail to see how UNC's win was possible. That may be true, but notice that what 
determines the success of the explanation is not whether she apprehends this proposition, but 
whether she is able to mentally represent the scenario it describes. Crucially, she does not need 
this proposition to see how the scenario in question is possible. When she watches the video, she 
may be unable to fully articulate such a proposition, but that would not render unsuccessful the 
how-possibly explanation, as long as she could still imagine the scenario. This suggests that it is 
the mental representation, not the proposition, that does the explanatory work. Put another way, a 
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skeptic can come to see how some state of affairs is possible without apprehending a detailed 
proposition describing the scenario that gives rise to that state of affairs, but she cannot see how 
it is possible without mentally representing the scenario such a proposition would describe.  
 Neither the boids simulation nor the basketball video directly explains how the state of 
affairs in question is possible. It is only in conjunction with the skeptic's background beliefs and 
imaginative capacity that either of them furnishes a mental representation that does explanatory 
work. If a skeptic about leaderless flocking observed the boids simulation without being told 
how it was made (viz. the simple rules that gave rise to the flock-like behavior), that simulation 
alone would not function, for her, as a how-possibly explanation. She would not be able to 
connect the simple forms on a screen to actual birds in the ways requisite for her to see how it is 
possible that birds might flock leaderlessly in accordance with the rules specified in the boids 
simulation. It is only when she can envision for herself how the mechanism depicted in the 
simulation might underwrite the flocking of actual birds that she has access to a how-possibly 
explanation. 
 Earlier, I noted that the explanandum in a how-possibly explanation is modal, so it is 
natural to wonder if the explanans is also modal. Given that I take the explanans to be a mental 
representation, I do not take it to be modal in the straightforward sense that the explanandum is. 
The explanans is not a proposition about the possibility or necessity of some state of affairs (or a 
conjunction of such propositions). But it is modal in the sense that it not only represents some 
state of affairs, but also represents it as possible given the skeptic's background beliefs.  
 Though I would like to provide a thoroughgoing account of just what kind of mental 
representation is involved in imagination, that is beyond the scope of this chapter. I can, 
however, say a bit more about one necessary feature of the sort of imagining that allows a person 
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to see how some state of affairs is possible. The mental representation must involve an 
understanding of how to construct a non-mental representation of a possible world in which that 
state of affairs obtains.56 It must include enough information that the imaginer could, for 
example, make a drawing of the state of affairs, or build a model of it, or act it out in a bit of 
theater, or sketch out an athletic play with X's and O's symbolizing athletes, or in some similar 
way build a scenario in which the state of affairs occurs.57 In support of this claim, I rely on the 
highly intuitive thought that the ability to in some sense reconstruct something is a hallmark of 
true understanding. In other words, as Richard Feynman famously wrote on his blackboard 
shortly before his death, “what I cannot create, I do not understand” (Cropper 2001, p. 377).58  
 An example should help motivate this idea. Consider again the case in which a skeptic is 
presented with the boids simulation, but without knowing what it is intended to represent or how 
it was programmed. She would likely notice that it resembled birds flocking, and if someone told 
her that there was no leader in the system, she might accept it as a demonstration that it is 
possible for birds to flock leaderlessly. But only when someone explains to her the rules of the 
program – only when she is given sufficient information for her to understand how the 
simulation was built – can she see how it is possible for birds to flock leaderlessly. The test of 
whether she has enough information to understand how it was built, I submit, is whether she 
could create for herself a representation of the system.  
                                                 
56 This idea was first suggested to me by John Roberts. 
 
57 Nothing turns on the actual physical ability of the imaginer to create such a representation. Rather, these 
examples are simply meant to illustrate the kind of understanding the imaginer must possess in order for her to 
see how something is possible.  
 
58 Another scientifically venerable expression of what appears to be a similar sentiment can be found in Kelvin's 
Baltimore Lectures on Molecular Dynamics and the Wave Theory of Light (1884). He famously wrote: “I can 
never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical model, I can 
understand it” (p. 206).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 As my elaboration of condition (3) specifies, the corrective for a failure of imagination is 
a mental representation. On my view, this mental representation must depict a scenario that, for 
all the imaginer knows, could turn out to explain why the state of affairs whose possibility she is 
considering actually obtains. When, as is often the case, a simulacrum is called for to assist a 
skeptic in representing such a possibility, the simulacrum should supply whatever it is that would 
enable the skeptic to build a system that represents that state of affairs occurring. That is, it 
should supply the material to fill in the skeptic's imaginative deficit. It is no surprise that 
scientists investigating bird flocking experienced a collective imaginative deficit when it came to 
the possibility of leaderless flocking. Before technological advances made it possible to construct 
a simulacrum of bird flocking via a computer simulation, a representation of leaderless flocking 
was not cognitively available to scientists engaged in theorizing about bird flocking. Given the 
complexity of a flock and the limitations of human cognitive power, this is not surprising. Simple 
though the rules that constitute the boids simulation are, there is an obvious sense in which one 
could not perform the simulation entirely through mental representation (at least not easily). 
Even after studying the boids simulation, it is incredibly unlikely that a scientist could conduct a 
flock-sized iteration of the boids simulation in her mind, but that does not mean that she cannot 
see how it is possible. Because she knows how it is built, she can mentally represent a flock in 
the relevant sense. She sees how it is possible for there to be leaderless flight because she 
understands how the simulation was built and, on the basis of that understanding, she is in a 
position to build a representation of leaderless flocking herself. As computer simulations make it 
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increasingly easy for us to build complex systems, our imaginative capacities are extended and 
thus also our abilities to see how things are possible.  
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CHAPTER 4: MODULAR UNIFICATION SIMULATIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In Chapter 2, I discussed reverse-engineering simulations – a category of computer 
simulations that are commonplace in scientific research as a tool to galvanize a research program 
that is situated in a particularly epistemically bleak context of investigation. The purpose of 
reverse-engineering simulations is to generate and incrementally confirm hypotheses about target 
systems. The ideal adaptive agent models of human learning I explored in that chapter were 
conducted because there was little empirical work that could be done, given the researchers' 
epistemic state, to investigate the phenomenon of interest (the power law of learning). The 
researchers did not have a well-formed hypothesis on the table prior to undertaking the 
simulation project; rather, developing one was a primary objective of the study.  
 In this chapter, I will characterize a category of computer simulations that are like 
reverse-engineering simulations in that they are devised to mimic an observed behavior, but are 
unlike reverse-engineering simulations in that they are often employed in much less 
epistemically bleak situations. In fact, these simulations are frequently employed as a 
complement to fruitful empirical work by scientists who both have hypotheses on the table, and 
have feasible empirical methods at their disposal to test these hypotheses. In particularly 
illustrative cases, scientists using such simulations may even be working with hypotheses that are 
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already well-confirmed by their empirical evidence. I will argue that the fact that such 
simulations are still employed in these situations is evidence that computer simulations are often 
employed for a further, non-confirmatory function. On the account I will develop in this chapter, 
these simulations are employed largely for explanatory ends. However, unlike simulations 
designed to furnish how-possibly explanations, such as the cases I examined in Chapter 3, the 
simulations of interest in this chapter are devised to explain why phenomena actually occur.  
 In this chapter, I will argue that computer simulations, because of their inherent reliance 
on abstraction, are particularly well-suited to provide unifying explanations of the phenomena 
they seek to explain. The particular unifying value of these simulations comes partially from the 
familiar unificationist boast that they “do more with less,” but the source of this unifying value is 
different from the sources identified in the unificationist accounts of explanation provided by 
Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher. The simulations I describe in this chapter have a unifying 
power that is made possible by their modularity. Modular unification occurs when scientists are 
able to appeal to a modest stock of functional ingredients operating in concert in order to explain 
disparate phenomena.  
 To illustrate this unifying explanatory function of computer simulations, I will rely on a 
case study from behavioral psychology in which two competing hypotheses about trends in 
children's performance on word problems are tested. I will provide an overview of this study in 
Section 2, and I will raise the question of what unique value the computer simulation is able to 
contribute to the scientific research project in Section 3. In Section 4, I will briefly discuss the 
unificationist accounts of explanation offered by Friedman and Kitcher. I will present and 
develop my account of modular unification in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, I will offer an 
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account of why computer simulations are often so useful in offering modular unification 
explanations.  
 
2. Case Study: Simulation of Student Performance on Mathematical Word Problems 
 
 In 1986, psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins developed a computer program for 
simulating children's arithmetic problem solving that was subsequently used for various studies. 
One of the purposes that Cummins identified for creating the program was to “explain 
regularities in the data gleaned from children's solution attempts, particularly frequently 
occurring errors” (p. 147). In this section, I will explore how this simulation was used in one 
later study to achieve this stated goal. In illustrating the role played by the simulation in this 
study, I hope to highlight that it is prima facie puzzling that these researchers conducted a 
simulation as part of this study at all, given the success of the field experiment component and 
the relatively meager confirmatory contribution to be expected from the simulation results.  
 Cummins' simulation featured seven components, each one designed to be analogous to a 
feature of the psychological model on which the simulation was based. I will refer to each of 
these components as a module, in order to emphasize that they are programming units 
individuated by their functions that, taken together, comprise a complex whole. The first is a 
linguistic comprehension module, which encodes knowledge about the meanings of words likely 
to appear in children's word problems and knowledge about what strategies are appropriate for 
solving word problems of different forms (1988, p. 148). The second is a module implementing 
knowledge of sets and logical relations among sets in order to construct a mathematical problem 
structure on the basis of the word problem input (p. 150). The third is a module implementing 
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arithmetic counting strategies, and the fourth is a module implementing default or “best guess” 
solution strategies for a given mathematical problem structure (p. 151). The fifth module is a 
priority ordering of all the solution goals called a goal stack (147). The final two components are 
a module implementing short-term memory and a module implementing long-term memory (p. 
148). The basic version of the program could reliably solve fourteen common types of word 
problems encountered by children (p. 151).  
 In 1988, Cummins led a study that employed this computer program in conjunction with 
an empirical study of children's math problem solving in order to investigate the question of why 
children perform significantly worse on arithmetic word problems than on corresponding 
problems presented in numeric format (p. 405).59 The study involved both an empirical 
experiment with children and a corresponding simulation. For the experimental component of 
the study, thirty-eight first-grade children were asked to solve a set of eighteen story problems, 
and were also asked to recall to the researchers the content of these problems (both before and 
after solving them). They were also asked to solve each of the eighteen problems presented in 
numeric format (e.g. “3+5 = ?”) (p. 411). The researchers scored each student recall attempt 
according to how accurately it preserved the logical structure from the original problem (p. 413).  
 The researchers' hypothesis was that, for the most part, the children possessed the 
relevant mathematical concepts, and so their errors on the word problems would be mostly due to 
inadequate story comprehension (1988, p. 409). Given this hypothesis, the researchers predicted 
three outcomes. First, they predicted the students' performance on the story problems would vary 
systematically with their recall performance, but not with their performance on the numeric 
                                                 
59 Cummins et al. cite a study that found that children across the United States perform between 10% and 30% 
worse on arithmetic word problems than on comparable problems presented in numeric format (Carpenter et al, 
1980).  
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format version of the problem. Second, they predicted that the erroneous answers given by 
children to the story problems would often be correct solutions to their miscomprehended 
versions of the problems. Third, they predicted that student miscomprehensions of the problems 
would generally transform difficult problems to easier ones because “when faced with 
particularly difficult linguistic forms, children would try to simplify them to bring them more in 
line with linguistic forms with which they were more familiar” (p. 409). 
 All three of these predictions were borne out in the empirical study. Cummins et. al. 
reported that “as predicted, the overall pattern of recall accuracy closely resembled that of word 
problem solution accuracy, suggesting a strong relationship between the two” (1988, p. 413). 
From their comments, it is readily apparent that they took the results of their experiment to 
provide significant confirmation for their hypothesis. For example, they summarize the main 
conclusion of their empirical study as follows: “Structural recall, both correct and erroneous, 
provided clear evidence that children's problem solving strategies are determined by their 
comprehension of the problem stories” (p. 418). 
 After performing the empirical experiment, the researchers proceeded to employ 
Cummins' computer program as an additional investigative tool to explain the patterns they 
observed (1988). They cited as a reason for using this program its general “usefulness in 
explaining children's errors” (p. 421). Before running the program, they predicted that the errors 
most commonly committed by the students “could be simulated by manipulating verbal 
comprehension” within the program (p. 409). In other words, they predicted that altering the 
function of a particular module in the program would reproduce an error pattern that was similar 
to the one observed in their empirical study. They ran the simulation under four different 
knowledge conditions, each time inputting the same eighteen word problems that they had given 
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to the children. The four knowledge conditions were: full knowledge (no modules disabled), 
impaired logical-mathematical knowledge (in which the function of the module implementing 
sets and logical relations was hindered), and two versions of impaired linguistic knowledge (in 
which the function of the module encoding knowledge about the meanings of words was 
hindered in two ways) (p. 419). 
 This simulation was able to solve all eighteen story problems without error when it ran 
with full knowledge (1988, p. 421). Cummins et al. then ran the simulation with the same 
eighteen problems, but having removed only the program's knowledge concerning part-whole 
relations (p. 421). This iteration of the simulation still had word-to-function translation 
knowledge (e.g. “'altogether' means 'add'”), but it lacked its more complicated mathematico-
deductive inference capacities (e.g. “'2 dolls' is a part of the whole '5 toys'”). This simulation 
matched the observed response patterns poorly: it yielded similar responses on only four 
problems (p. 421-422). It did not provide answers at all for some questions, answered correctly 
some questions that very few children answered correctly, and answered incorrectly some 
questions that most children answered correctly.  
 In the third run of the computer simulation, the researchers removed the program's ability 
to map story-situations to part-whole structures (1988, p. 422). In their words, “this means that 
the simulation could not understand whole story situations, but instead could only search for key 
words and the like in order to trigger its conceptual knowledge concerning part-whole relations” 
(p. 422-423). This simulation also performed poorly at representing the observed data; it matched 
children's response patterns on only seven out of eighteen problems (p. 423).  
 In the final run of the computer simulation, the researchers altered the program's 
understanding of certain words and phrases in three ways: (1) they changed its understanding of 
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“some” from an unknown quantity specifier to an adjective (this change was supported by some 
previous research about how children respond to the word “some” in word problems); (2) they 
changed “have-more-than” (and other comparative forms) simply to “have” (based on research 
that children tend to ignore comparative linguistic forms when reading); and (3) they changed 
“altogether” to mean “each” on the basis of their own observations that children often seem to 
misinterpret “altogether” in this way (p. 425). This simulation performed reasonably well; it 
matched the observed response patterns on fifteen out of eighteen problems (p. 425). Summing 
up the results, Cummins et al. write: “the best match between the children's performance and the 
simulation's was obtained when the latter's language processing was altered, as opposed to its 
logico-mathematical knowledge” (p. 427). They continued to surmise, on the basis of both their 
empirical and simulation work, that “these results indicate that the characteristic errors reported 
here and elsewhere in the literature primarily reflect difficulties children have in assigning 
interpretations to certain words and phrases used in standard word problems” (p. 425). 
 
3. Motivating Question: Why simulate? 
 
 In the preceding case study, Cummins et al. had already obtained what they took to be 
considerable confirmation for their hypothesis from their field experiment. So it is natural to 
wonder why it was worthwhile to introduce an abstract computer simulation as a way of 
proceeding with the research program. What benefit did the computer simulation offer, given that 
the researchers already took their hypothesis to be well-confirmed by their empirical study? 
Unlike the reverse-engineering simulations I discussed in Chapter 2 – in which a simulation 
amounts to a last resort for investigating a target system about which few discriminating 
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observations are available – this was not a case for which the researchers lacked a testable 
hypothesis. Cummins et al. not only had a promising hypothesis (that the children's errors on the 
word problems were due mostly to inadequate story comprehension and not inadequate 
mathematical understanding) formulated in advance of conducting the simulation, but they had 
also already amassed a good deal of confirmation for their hypothesis by performing a traditional 
empirical study with the target population. The motivation for choosing to run a computer 
simulation of the target system is therefore much less obvious than it is in the case of reverse-
engineering simulations.  
 It is important to note that the researchers did take this simulation study to have a 
confirmatory function. One of the stated purposes for employing the simulation was to test the 
hypothesis favored by Cummins et al. against the rival hypothesis “that comprehension failures 
reflect deficiencies in [logico-mathematical] conceptual knowledge” (1988, p. 419). Certainly, 
the researchers had marginally more evidence for their story-miscomprehension hypothesis (and 
against the rival hypothesis) after running the computer simulation than they did on the basis of 
just the empirical results. But, importantly, it does not seem that they had more confirmation than 
they could have had with, for example, additional empirical research. It is therefore illuminating 
to consider why the simulation in this case is a particularly valuable complement to the 
empirical work.  
 One might reasonably think that a confirmatory benefit of the simulation over the 
empirical study is that the computer simulation enabled the researchers to formulate and test a 
more precise hypothesis than they were able to in the empirical study. As I mentioned above, the 
researchers tweaked the simulation's language processing modules in ways that were suggested 
by other psychological research on children's language processing (e.g. the researchers 
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reprogrammed the simulation to understand “some” as an adjective rather than as a quantifier). 
However, in practice, the researchers acknowledge that these precise tweaks were not clearly 
confirmed, even though they took their general hypothesis to be confirmed. The researchers 
made specific predictions about the ways their modifications to the language-processing module 
would alter the simulation's performance, and the simulation produced a number of discrepancies 
with these predictions (Cummins et al. 1988, p. 427). For instance, there were some problems 
that employed the term “some” that children frequently failed to answer correctly. The 
researchers expected that the children were interpreting “some” as an adjective, and that this was 
a common cause of the failure to answer this question correctly. However, the computer 
simulation did not reflect this; the program consistently answered these questions correctly, even 
when it interpreted “some” as an adjective (p. 427). The researchers reported that it was “not 
clear why this discrepancy occurred,” but they followed their discussion of these discrepancies 
with this overall assessment of the confirmatory value of the simulation:  
Most important to our endeavor is the fact that the patterns of solution difficulty 
reported here and elsewhere in the literature could be accounted for simply by 
manipulating linguistic aspects of the simulation program. The major 
determinant of its solution characteristics was whether the nature of its linguistic 
processing afforded access to its conceptual knowledge. (1988, p. 427) 
 
So while the researchers' general hypothesis (that children's errors were due to inadequate story 
comprehension rather than a deficient grasp of mathematical concepts) was incrementally 
confirmed by the relative success of the simulation that featured a weakened language processing 
module, it is not actually clear that the simulation offered much by way of clear confirmation or 
disconfirmation regarding any precise hypotheses about the particular features of language 
processing that accounted for the children's error patterns. 
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 But even if the researchers had been able to confirm a more precise version of hypothesis 
by implementing this simulation, it is clear that they took the simulation to have a further value. 
They mention at several points that the simulation is particularly useful for explaining the target 
phenomenon. In their discussion of the results of their study, Cummins et al. explore ways in 
which their simulation results support much broader claims than the hypothesis about children's 
problem solving that motivated the study. They devote time to characterizing the simulation 
results at a general level, reporting for instance that those results “suggest that common solution 
error patterns are directly related to the linguistic sophistication possessed by the solver” and that 
“robust linguistic knowledge produced successful solution attempts regardless of text 
characteristics, but the attempts were more time and resource-demanding” (p. 435). After 
describing their findings at this level, they go on to suggest that: 
This description of successful arithmetic problem solving... is consistent with 
descriptions of problem solving in other “adult” domains, such as physics (e.g. 
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981) and chess (Newell & Simon, 1972). In these 
domains, expertise development is typically considered a matter of constructing 
problem type schemata and using such structures to guide comprehension (p. 436). 
 
 
The researchers describe this capacity for problem solving via identifying problem-type 
schemata as arising from the characteristic interactions of the modules featured in the simulation. 
Specifically, they write that the particular ways in which the linguistic processing module 
facilitates access to the relevant logico-mathematical concepts makes this construction of 
problem type schemata possible (p. 435). Furthermore, they suspect that the explanation of 
problem-solving provided by the simulation generalizes, writing that:  
The implications of the present paper go far beyond the domain of children's 
arithmetic. The various determinants of problem difficulty that were explored 
here are likely to be important in any domain where problems are described in 
verbal formats. (1988, p. 437)  
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Thus, though they originally set out to explain why word problems are so difficult for children, 
they note as a virtue of the simulation that it appeals to features of problem solving that are also 
cited in explanations of problem solving in demographics beyond the children they worked with 
in their empirical study. I take this to be evidence that the researchers see as one major benefit of 
the simulation that it provides a better explanation of the target phenomenon than it would if it 
were only locally applicable. The sense in which it is not merely locally applicable is that the 
modules out of which the simulation is composed have analogues in various other human 
problem-solving systems. Cummins et al. appear to suggest that simulations consisting of the 
same basic “ingredients” (where sameness is assessed at a more general level of description than 
a precise description of the program's content) could be developed to offer explanations of other 
patterns in problem-solving.  
 I will argue in Section 5 that the fact that this simulation accurately represents not only its 
target system, but also additional target systems within the same domain, is an important 
explanatory virtue, and one that computer simulations are particularly well-suited to promote. In 
terms familiar to philosophers of science, computer simulations are often uniquely well-suited to 
provide unificatory explanations of empirically observable phenomena. I will offer an account of 
this explanatory achievement in Section 5. 
 
4. Explanation as Unification 
 
 Wendy Parker has argued, with examples from climate science, that simulations can be 
employed to shed light on causal dependencies and mechanisms that underlie the observed 
behavior of target systems (2014). I will argue that there is a significant additional source of 
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explanatory power apart from the ones identified by Parker. Broadly construed, this source of 
explanatory power comes from the ability of a simulation to unify a target phenomenon with 
other phenomena. Before arguing for a particular and novel notion of explanatory unification that 
captures the explanatory value of the case study I presented in Section 2, I will examine some 
claims that other philosophers of science have made about the explanatory value of unification. 
 Although unification has long been claimed by various philosophers and scientists to be 
intimately bound up with scientific explanation, Michael Friedman was the first philosopher to 
carefully articulate an account according to which explanation is identified with unification 
(1974). Friedman presented his unificationist account as an answer to the question of why 
scientific explanations increase our understanding of the world. He motivated his account by 
appealing to the example of the kinetic theory of gases, arguing that the explanatory value of this 
theory consists in the fact that it refers to a sparse set of facts about the behavior of gas 
molecules in order to explain several disparate phenomena involving the behavior of gases: the 
fact that they obey the Boyle-Charles law, the fact that they obey Graham's law of diffusion, and 
the fact that they have the specific heat capacities that they do (1974, p. 14-15). He writes “where 
we once had three independent brute facts... we now have only one – that molecules obey the 
laws of mechanics” (p. 15). He adds “Furthermore, the kinetic theory also allows us to integrate 
the behavior of gases with other phenomena, such as the motion of the planets and of falling 
bodies near the earth” (p. 15). This unificatory power is, he says, the essence of scientific 
explanation (p. 15). He writes that “science increases our understanding of the world by reducing 
the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given,” and 
that this is because “a world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal, more 
comprehensible than one with more” (p. 15). So, on this picture, explanations increase our 
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understanding of the world insofar as they subsume a greater number of phenomena under one 
explanatory set of facts. By showing that many ostensibly independent phenomena are actually 
derivable from to a single set of facts, we reduce our puzzlement about why seemingly disparate 
phenomena obtain.  
 Crucially, Friedman's discussion of the unifying power of scientific explanation is 
restricted to the explanatory power of laws (1974). Seeing that this was too restrictive, Philip 
Kitcher later expanded Friedman's insight to include unifying argument forms as explanations 
(1981). Kitcher attributes some of the motivation of his view to Hempel, whom he quotes:  
What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation aims at is not [an] 
intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of 
insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena 
as manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes that conform 
to specific, testable, basic principles. (Hempel 1966, p. 83) 
 
To motivate the need for an account of scientific explanation in the first place, Kitcher appeals to 
a commonsense claim in the spirit of Friedman: “natural sciences do not merely pile up unrelated 
items of knowledge of more or less practical significance, but they increase our understanding of 
the world” (1981, p. 508). An account of scientific explanation, he agrees, should make it clear 
why scientific explanation advances this understanding.  
 On Kitcher's account, explanations are arguments that succeed at best unifying the set of 
accepted scientific statements at a given time (1981). Arguments are more unificatory, in the 
relevant sense, when they exhibit the same argument pattern as many other arguments. A theory 
with a great deal of explanatory power is one that is able to explain many phenomena using the 
same argument pattern. To further develop this idea, Kitcher introduces the notion of an 
explanatory store, a reserve of argument forms available for scientists to use in explanation (p. 
512). He stipulates that there will be only one explanatory store for all of the beliefs accepted by 
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a scientific community regarding some particular inquiry at a single point in time (p. 512). The 
explanatory store will change over time to include the argument patterns that are “acceptable as 
the basis for acts of explanation” by all those scientists who share the relevant belief set (p. 512). 
The unifying power present in a body of research is, for Kitcher, “achieved by generating a large 
number of accepted sentences as the conclusions of acceptable arguments, which instantiate a 
few, stringent patterns” (p. 520). 
 As an answer to the question of why unifying explanations advance understanding, 
Kitcher echoes some of Friedman's thoughts on the value of unification, though he argues for a 
different account of what unification amounts to (1981, p. 530). His view of how unification 
advances our understanding is that “by using a few patterns of argument in the derivation of 
many beliefs, we minimize the number of types of premises we must take as underived. That is, 
we reduce, in so far as possible, the number of types of facts we must accept as brute” (p. 530). I 
will explore the promotion of understanding as a benefit of simulations that provide unifying 
explanations in the next section, though I will depart from both Friedman's method of cashing it 
out with reference to a reduction in the number of token unexplained explainers and Kitcher's 
method of cashing it out with reference to a reduction in the number of types of unexplained 
explainers. I will also depart from both of these pictures by regarding unification as one among 
many ways that an explanation can advance understanding of a target phenomenon. 
 Kitcher suggests that, going forward, “what needs to be done is to look closely at the 
argument patterns favored by scientists and attempt to understand what characteristics they 
share” (p. 530). I agree with Kitcher, but submit that we should look at scientific practice more 
generally (not restricting our observations to argument patterns) to see which characteristics 
explanatory enterprises in science share. Many contemporary scientific research projects rely on 
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computer simulations to explain scientific phenomena, and an important feature that many of 
these simulations share is that they employ a relatively small store of discrete modules in various 
configurations to represent target systems. That is, they share the feature of modularity. This 
seems to me one reason to take seriously the prospect that this kind of modularity is 
explanatorily valuable. I will argue that the explanatory value of such modularity in simulation 
can be understood in terms of unificatory power.  
 I agree with Friedman and Kitcher that unifying a phenomenon of interest with other 
phenomena seems intuitively to yield an important kind of understanding of that phenomenon. 
Moreover, I agree with the general unificationist notion that there is explanatory value in '”doing 
more with less.” That is, an explanation is better ceteris paribus when it can use a relatively small 
stock of information to explain a multitude of phenomena. However, neither Friedman's account 
nor Kitcher's account fully captures the explanatory contribution of the simulation in the case 
study at hand.  
 The researchers simulating children's mathematical problem solving do not at any point 
signal that they take the simulation to represent any laws of nature, as Friedman's account would 
require in order for the simulation to be explanatory. It may be that there is some way of 
describing the simulation such that one is able to identify the sort of counterfactual-supporting 
generalization that could serve as a candidate law (say, a law of psychology), but there is no 
evidence in the study that the researchers interpret the simulation this way. They do not mention 
laws at any point, nor do they summarize the results of the simulation by making statements that 
exhibit the properties typically associated with laws (language conveying physical necessity, for 
example). I take the fact that the researchers do not describe their results in this way to be some 
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evidence that they do not view the simulation as having its value because it in some way 
subsumes the phenomenon in question under a law.  
 Furthermore, I do not see any way to neatly present the explanatory content of the word-
problem simulation in an argument form of the sort Kitcher describes, so I do not think that his 
unificationist picture can accurately capture the unificatory power of the simulation either. For 
Kitcher, a unifying explanation must consist of a sequence of sentences that instantiates a general 
argument pattern and from which a sentence describing the target of explanation can be derived 
(1981, p. 516-517). An argument pattern consists of a set of what he calls “filling instructions” 
for each of the terms in an argument schema and a classification of the argument schema that 
specifies which sentences are to be understood as premises and what rules of inference should be 
employed (p. 516-517). To be unifying, the same general argument pattern must be used to 
derive many other accepted sentences (p. 520). The authors in the case study do not, of course, 
characterize their interpretation of the simulation in this level of detail, but there are at least two 
reasons to think that Kitcher's unificationist account is not able to capture the distinct 
explanatory contribution of this simulation.  
 First of all, the pattern that the researchers are attempting to explain is not derived from 
the simulation, as the target of explanation must be on Kitcher's account. In fact, the simulation 
only matched the student response patterns on fifteen out of eighteen questions, so the actual 
performance of the target system was not even exactly matched by the simulation. Secondly, the 
authors write in their assessment of the simulation that “the various determinants of problem 
difficulty that were explored here are likely to be important in any domain where problems are 
described in verbal formats” (Cummins et al., 1988, p. 437). The researchers do not seem to be 
suggesting anything as precise as what Kitcher requires of an explanatory argument, but rather, I 
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take it that they are indicating that the same “determinants” of problem difficulty are going to 
show up in many explanations of problem-solving phenomena. As I will show in the next 
section, there is a better way to capture this sort of unificatory value than artificially imposing an 
argument structure onto the simulation and the researchers' interpretation of its significance.  
 Perhaps more importantly than the details of why neither Kitcher's nor Friedman's 
accounts apply naturally to the simulation employed in the word problem case study is the point 
that it is not necessary to characterize the simulation as manifesting a law or as presenting an 
argument in order to show that it is unificatory. Neither Friedman's account nor Kitcher's account 
provides an accurate description of what this simulation offers the research program, and yet, I 
will argue in the next section, the simulation has unificatory power anyway.   
 There is an additional important difference to note between the kind of claims for which 
Friedman and Kitcher argue in offering accounts of explanation as unification and the kind of 
unificatory value for which I will argue in the next section. Friedman and Kitcher both think that 
explanation can somehow be reduced to unification, but I do not share this view. I want to take 
on board their suggestion that unification is explanatorily valuable without taking on their 
supposition that to be unifying in a particular way is just what it is to be an explanation. I do not 
think that unification is a necessary condition for something's being a scientific explanation. 
Rather, I claim that an explanation's being unifying is oftentimes an explanatory virtue. If an 
explanation has explanatory power that extends to other systems beyond its target system, this 
will likely be a respect in which it provides a deeper explanation of the target phenomenon than a 
non-unifying explanation would.  
 While both Friedman and Kitcher may have accurately characterized explanatory virtues 
in developing their accounts of unification, I think that they and other philosophers of science 
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writing about explanation have overlooked a separate and importantly different explanatory 
virtue that falls into the broad category of unification. This kind of unifying power can be 
achieved by showing that multiple observable data patterns can be explained by using the same 
modest supply of modules (functional component parts) to represent the complex systems that 
give rise to them. In characterizing this explanatory virtue, which I call modular unification. I 
will argue not only that modular unification is an important and neglected kind of explanatory 
contribution, but also that computer simulations are uniquely well-suited to achieve this kind of 
unification. I will make use of a version of Kitcher's notion of the “explanatory store,” but I will 
identify its contents as modules rather than argument forms. I will depart from the rest of the 
specific details of Kitcher's account of unification, as well as the details of Friedman's account.  
 
5. Addition to the Unificatory Model: Modularity 
 
 Though I will draw on the broad unificationist insights of Friedman to motivate my 
account of the explanatory value of the word problem simulation in the case study above, much 
of the value of such a simulation can be derived from the informal unificationist slogan that it is 
explanatorily beneficial to “do more with less.” There are perhaps myriad respects in which 
modular unification is explanatory beneficial, but I will focus on its ability to explain more, both 
in the sense that it offers more explanations and in the sense that it offers new kinds of 
explanations (explanations that provide understanding of target systems that cannot be achieved 
with other kinds of explanation). The relevant sense of doing more with less in the case study 
above is indicated by the comments about the broad value of the simulation made by Cummins et 
al. in their discussion of the simulation's value. Recall that they reported the following: 
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This description of successful arithmetic problem-solving... is consistent with 
descriptions of problem solving in other “adult” domains, such as physics (e.g. 
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981) and chess (Newell & Simon, 1972). In these 
domains, expertise development is typically considered a matter of constructing 
problem type schemata and using such structures to guide comprehension (1988, 
p. 436). 
 
Here, the researchers mention as a virtue of the simulation that it yields a description of children 
solving word problems that is importantly similar to descriptions other scientists have given of 
adults solving various other types of problems – like deciding what chess move to make, for 
instance. 
 One way to interpret the authors here is as suggesting that the very same simulation can 
furnish an explanation of these disparate phenomena. But I do not think that is the most 
reasonable inference to draw. There may, of course, be an explanatory benefit to successfully 
encompassing multiple phenomena with the same simulation, but that is presumably not the 
possibility they are suggesting here. More likely, the authors are noting as an explanatory virtue 
of the simulation that it exhibits certain similarities with the functional composition of other 
systems of human problem solving. They are attending to a sort of modularity of the systems. 
 Cummins et al. appear optimistic that a simulation consisting of modules with the same 
functions as the modules present in the word problem simulation could be developed to 
effectively simulate chess reasoning and other sorts of problem solving. This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that they offer a survey of other simulations that have been devised to 
capture problem-solving in various domains and describe the similarities and differences 
between these simulations and their simulation in terms of the modules that they take to be 
similar to the modules in their simulation (p. 436). In situating their work within this broader 
practice of simulating problem-solving behaviors, they repeatedly emphasize that such 
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simulations reveal the importance of functional features shared across problem-solving domains 
(p. 436-437). They write that such simulations “help us derive a fuller understanding of the 
processes involved in problem solving and reasoning” (p. 437).  
 
 5.1 What are modules? 
 
 Before I can more fully argue for modular unification as a unique explanatory benefit, it 
is necessary to say a bit more about what I take a module to be. A module is a distinct, self-
contained functional unit that performs a characteristic function on the basis of an input. For 
instance, the addition function in a calculator is a simple module. Likewise, a university's 
admissions department is also a module because it is a discrete functional unit within a university 
that produces an incoming class (output) on the basis of an applicant pool (input). A combination 
of modules can be used to form a complex whole. Modules are individuated on the basis of 
function – that is, according to their characteristic functions, not according to the token contents 
they take as inputs and produce as outputs. The content of the module (e.g. the specific words 
and phrases that a language processing module is designed to take as its inputs and outputs) 
matters to individuating modules only insofar as sensitivity to content is indispensable in 
specifying the module's function. For this reason, it is reasonable to think of a module as a sort of 
black box that is defined only by its functional role in a system.60 I will argue that there is an 
explanatory benefit that comes from representing various systems by putting the same functional 
parts (modules) in combination, even when the content of their functions differs considerably. 
                                                 
60 I am invoking the notion of “black box” familiar to engineers and computer scientists, namely that a black box is 
a functional unit defined only by its inputs and outputs (and not its inner workings).  
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And I will argue that computer simulations are especially well-suited to achieve this modular 
unification. 
 
 5.2 Modular Unification as Explanatory  
 
  I submit that there is an important explanatory value in showing that the same modest 
stock of functional ingredients operating in concert with one another are capable of furnishing 
explanations for multiple phenomena. Unifying these phenomena by showing them to be results 
of the same underlying modules (though with various tweaks in strength and content) marks an 
advancement in scientists' understanding of these phenomena. It is therefore natural that it would 
also mark an increase in the researchers' appraisal of the simulation's explanatory power. The 
prospect of achieving this kind of unification, and therefore the prospect of obtaining an 
explanation that furthers understanding in this way, would justify the addition of a simulation to 
complement a flourishing research project. In this section, I will offer an account of modular 
unification explanations that shows how they “do more with less.”  
 Of course, a modular explanation is fitting only when the target system in question is, in 
some sense, modular. Not all phenomena arise from modular systems, and so modular 
explanations are not always appropriate. For some phenomena, the pictures of unification 
suggested by Friedman and Kitcher would better capture an explanatory achievement than the 
account of unification I am describing. However, given that some phenomena admit of 
explanation by modular unification, I think the explanatory store for some research projects 
should be understood to include modules in addition to explanatory argument schema. It may be 
a scientific success when scientists can subsume many different phenomena under a small 
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number of explanatory schemata, but it should also be understood as an explanatory success 
when scientists can explain many different phenomena by using the same set of modules.   
 How are various modular systems unified in the relevant sense? I would like to suggest 
two ways in which this unification can occur. The first sort of unification occurs when a set of 
phenomena are all explained using the same set of modules (recall that modules are individuated 
according to their characteristic functions, not according to the token contents they take as their 
inputs and outputs), though they may have different contents and function at different strengths. I 
will refer to this type of modular unification as simple modular unification. This is the respect of 
unification that occurs in the non-simulation case of modular unification I discuss in the next 
subsection. In such a case, various phenomena are unified when they are revealed to be 
composed of the very same functional ingredients.  
 The second way for explanations of target phenomena to exhibit modular unification 
occurs when the target systems in question are shown to bear family resemblances to one another. 
These resemblances arise out of the fact that the same modest stock of modules can be used to 
explain each of the disparate phenomena in question, though perhaps some of the systems are 
constituted by only some of the modules in that stock. To illustrate this, it is helpful to appeal to 
the notion of family resemblances that Renford Bambrough proposed as a precisification of 
Wittgenstein's comments about such resemblances (1960).61 In the following passage, 
Bambrough offers a simple formal characterization of family resemblances:  
We may classify a set of objects by reference to the presence or absence of features 
ABCDE. It may well happen that five objects edcba are such that each of them has 
                                                 
61 Bambrough precisified the notion in this way for in order to provide a solution to the problem of universals (i.e. a 
class of related philosophical puzzles generated from the assumption that there must be some metaphysical entity 
to explain why individual items are rightly grouped by the same term) (1960). 
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four of these properties and lacks the fifth, and that the missing feature is different 
in each of the five cases. A simple diagram will illustrate this situation: 
 
Here we can already see how natural and how proper it might be to apply the same 
word to a number of objects between which there is no common feature. (p. 209-210) 
 
Bambrough may be right in his suggestion that it is natural in this case to apply the same term to 
all of these objects, but this point is not the one I wish to address here. I wish to suggest another 
application of this depiction of family resemblances, and my suggestion involves a 
reinterpretation of his formalism. Imagine that edcba represent various target systems (say, for 
example, categories of human problem solving), and ABCDE represent modules that feature in 
explanatory simulations of the respective phenomena. There is a natural and clear sense in which 
these phenomena are unified once it has been made plain that various configurations of the same 
modules feature in each of their explanations. In this simple case, one may think of the 
explanatory store as containing the modest stock of modules represented by ABCDE.  
 Notice that, in both kinds of modular unification, the relevant degree of unification is 
even greater if, in addition to the modules themselves, the explanations of the various systems 
include depictions of characteristic functional relationships among the modules. If A and B 
exhibit certain effects on one another when they exist as parts of the same system, that 
relationship will obtain in each of the systems of which A and B are constitutive parts. And an 
explanation that represents this relationship will be more unifying that one that does not because 
it will make clear another dimension of functional similarity among the target systems. So, in 
cases for which an explanation of a system depicts characteristic functional relations among the 
modules (which I take to typical of modular explanations furnished by computer simulations), 
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the various systems are unified not only in the sense that a modest stock of modules are present 
in the various systems, but also in the sense that a stock of familiar functional relations are 
manifest in the explanations.  
 In a case of simple modular unification, each of the modules in a research program's 
explanatory store will end up in the explanation of every system that is unified under the store. In 
a case of family resemblance modular unification, it will not be the case that every system's 
explanation will feature every module or every relationship among modules that is in the 
explanatory store, but each system will be explained with reference to some of the modules and 
relationships among the modules that are found in the explanatory store. Presumably, family 
resemblance modular unification will be more common than simple modular unification in 
complex research programs such as the word problem case study I discussed above. But both of 
these types of modular unification are recognizably explanatory virtues.  
  
 5.3 A Non-Simulation Case of Modular Unification 
 
 It may help to illustrate my notion of modular unification with reference to a form of 
explanation found in Plato's Republic. I will loosely refer to this as an example from early 
political science, though the investigative methodology may not be accurately characterized as 
scientific. What is important is not that Plato confirms his theory through scientifically sound 
means, but rather that, if what he says is true, he has offered a series of explanations that are 
valuable in part because they exhibit modular unification.  
 Plato spends a great deal of time in the Republic developing his famous account of the 
tripartite soul, the three parts of which are the reason-loving part, the honor-loving part (also 
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called the spirited part), and the appetitive part. Plato further claims that all people can be 
divided into three categories, those who are governed by their reason-loving part, those who are 
governed by their honor-loving part, and those who are governed by their appetitive part. Plato 
goes on to identify five different political regimes that can be explained in terms of the 
prevalence and function in the population of people of those three types: aristocracy, timocracy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.  
 In book VIII of the Republic, Plato tells us that the ideal city (the aristocracy) obtains 
when all the parts are doing what they are best suited for. In that case, the population of the city 
that is governed by love of reason has the majority of the power, and this part rules over the other 
parts. In characterizing this city, he provides an explanation of the city's function in terms the 
roles played by each component, each political module. Plato then goes on to provide a detailed 
causal explanation of how each regime could arise within a society. He thinks one devolves into 
another, beginning with an aristocracy devolving into a timocracy so on down the line until the 
causal chain results in tyranny. He writes, for example, that an aristocracy devolves into a 
timocracy (a society in which all the power ends up in the hands of the military or honor-loving 
people) in part as a result of members of the reason-loving class marrying members of other 
classes. He says that this intermixing “will engender a lack of likeness and unharmonious 
inequality” which will “breed war and hostility” (547a). But Plato also gives an explanation of 
each regime in terms the function and interrelation of its component parts, the three populations 
with characteristic functions. He explains that a timocracy results “because of the predominance 
of the spirited element,” because “the love of victory and the love of honor” is the part most 
powerfully manifest in the population (Republic VII, 548c). 
105 
 
 If one imagines that Plato's theory is an accurate representation of human psychology and 
of political organization, there is a notable difference in the kind of understanding furthered by 
the two types of explanation that he gives: the causal-historical explanation of how each political 
regime arises from developments in a previous regime, and a constitutive explanation of how 
each type of regime produces its characteristic behavior as a result of its composition in terms of 
the three types of people. I think there is an important and distinct explanatory benefit in Plato 
unifying all of the political regimes by identifying their constitutions in terms of the same three 
categories of people. Though he may be able to explain the timocratic state in another way (by 
giving a causal history), Plato achieves something of distinct explanatory importance in 
revealing that the timocracy is composed of the same functional parts as the other four political 
regimes he thinks may arise in a society. He unifies the timocracy with the other regimes, thereby 
explaining its particular societal features as an interaction of the three classes of people that are 
present in each regime. By showing that each of the five regimes can be explained by identifying 
a configuration of three simple modules (the same three parts with characteristic functions), Plato 
supplies explanatory information that could not be achieved, even in principle, by a causal-
historical explanation.  
 This is a case of unifying disparate phenomena, and it is a case in which that unification 
is enabled by the clear modularity of the systems and of the corresponding explanations. In this 
case, the very same modules (though operating at different strengths) appear in the explanations 
of all five regimes, so this is a case of simple modular unification rather than family resemblance 
modular unification. Though the word problem simulation I presented above is much more 
complex than this example from Plato, I think the simulation exhibits the same explanatory 
106 
 
virtue (though in a somewhat different form) that is found in this non-simulation case of modular 
unification.  
 
 5.4 Modular Unification as an Explanatory Virtue in the Word Problem Case Study 
 
  How does the account of modular unification I am proposing apply to the word problem 
case study? Recall the claim by Cummins et al. that the description of problem solving that is 
furnished by the word problem simulation is consistent with descriptions of the elements of 
problem solving across other domains (for instance, chess) (1988, p. 436). They wrote further 
that the factors that determined the difficulty of problem solving in this case would likely turn 
out to be important in accounting for problem solving in a wide range of domains (p. 437). This 
seems to suggest a view according to which some (though perhaps not all) of the modules in the 
word problem simulation could be employed to represent how a chess-player solves the puzzle of 
what move she should make. Perhaps simulations of both chess-players and word-problem-
solving first-graders would need goal stacks to rank their priorities and modules supplying them 
with part-whole reasoning. There would presumably be some differences too. For example, a 
chess-player simulation would not need a linguistic comprehension module, though it would 
need a spatial-reasoning module. On my interpretation, by noting that their simulation bears 
certain similarities to other human problem-solving endeavors, Cummins et al. are highlighting a 
potential explanatory power of the system that stems from its capacity for modular unification. 
The researchers are drawing our attention to the idea that at least some of the same modules and 
relations among those modules that feature in the their explanation of the word-problem-solving 
patterns will end up in explanations of these other phenomena. That is, they are adverting to the 
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second form of modular unification I discussed above: family resemblance modular unification. 
Though the simulation that represents chess reasoning and therefore explains the chess patterns 
will presumably include modules that are not found in the word problem simulation, there is still 
a kind of unification at play. I take the authors to be indicating that a significant portion of the 
same modules and relations among those modules will end up in explanations of both 
phenomena. 
 It is worth noting that psychological phenomena might be particularly amenable to 
explanation via modular unification because there is independent reason to believe the target 
system is a modular system. Notably, Jerry Fodor famously argued for a detailed account of the 
mind's modularity that has been hugely influential in recent decades (1983). Fodor uses the term 
“modularity” to refer to something much more specific than the sense of modularity I am 
employing in this chapter, but even philosophers and cognitive scientists who reject Fodor's 
account accept as uncontroversial the thesis of functional decomposition. Functional 
decomposition is the idea that “the mind can be described as a network of interconnected 
systems and subsystems” that are individuated by their functions (Prinz, 2006, p. 35). If the mind 
is functionally decomposable, it is composed of modules in the sense that I am employing in this 
chapter (in which modules are distinct, self-contained functional units that perform characteristic 
functions on the basis of inputs).  
 Given that the functional decomposition of the mind is widely accepted by researchers 
investigating psychological phenomena, it is no surprise that a modular representation of 
children's word problem solving would be sought by Cummins et al., and that a representation of 
this phenomenon that unified it with disparate psychological phenomena such as chess-playing 
would be of especially great explanatory value. Developing a simulation whose modules 
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correspond to the functions into which the mind is decomposable is a clear goal of scientists 
studying psychological phenomena. If scientists are right that minds are all functionally 
decomposable into the same basic functional units, one would naturally expect some of the same 
functional parts of the mind to feature in explanations of any psychological phenomena, 
including those as disparate as children solving word problems and adults solving chess-
problems. Thus, modular unification is a fitting explanatory goal for scientists who study 
psychological phenomena. 
 
 5.5 What is the distinctly explanatory benefit of modular unification?  
 
 In this section, I will characterize some respects in which modular unification 
explanations can provide deeper explanations than explanations of the same phenomena that are 
not unifying in this way. Each of these is a respect in which a modular unification explanation 
leads to greater understanding.  
 It is worth mentioning as a preliminary matter that a relatively uninteresting explanatory 
benefit of a modular unification explanation is that, when a target system is modular, an 
explanation that is modular is able to reflect this feature of the target system. I grant that there is 
an obvious virtue of an explanation's being modular if its target system is modular, but I will 
argue in this section that the explanatory power of modular unification extends beyond this 
simple virtue. Though I suspect there are many explanatory benefits of modular unification, I 
will discuss three of these benefits in this section. 
 The first is that there is an explanatory benefit in coming to understand a target system as 
a member of a type. In a successful case of modular unification (and perhaps other sorts of 
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unification), the achievement is not just that a new explanation is provided. Rather, there is an 
important sense in which a modular unification explanation takes as its target a different 
explanandum than a non-modular unification explanation of the same phenomenon does.62 The 
same phenomenon can, of course, be identified under different descriptions. If one identifies the 
explanandum with a particular description of a phenomenon rather than with the phenomenon 
itself (as I will hereafter), modular unification enables the explanation of a new explanandum, 
though the phenomenon remains the same as the one scientists initially set out to investigate. In a 
successful case of explanation by modular unification, the explanandum is properly specified as 
including the type-membership of the phenomenon. So, fully specified, the explanandum in the 
children's word-problem-solving simulation is that children perform in a particular observable 
pattern on mathematical word problems, given that they are members of a class of modular 
systems (namely, beings whose problem solving occurs as a mental process). Thus, the 
simulation answers a more specific question than “why is this pattern observed in children's 
word-problem-solving performance?”. It answers the question, “why is this pattern observed in 
children's word-problem-solving performance, given that children are beings whose problem 
solving occurs as a mental process?” 
 To 'explain X, given that Y' is to invoke Y in the explanation of X. One could give an 
explanation of children's performance on word problems that does not invoke their membership 
in the broader category of beings whose problem solving occurs as a mental process. That is, one 
could explain their performance without invoking the fact that the features responsible for their 
                                                 
62 The idea that different ways of explaining what are ostensibly the same phenomena actually pick out different 
explananda is not a completely novel one. Ian Hacking has argued that statistical laws have additional explanatory 
power because they explain events that happen due to chance under a different kind of description than the 
description of them given by deterministic explanations (1990, p. 181-182).  
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performance are shared with other beings whose problem solving occurs as a mental process. A 
collection of fully detailed neurological histories of all the individual children that revealed the 
causes of each problem-solving event would explain why they performed as they did without 
explaining why they performed as they did, given that they are beings whose problem solving 
occurs as a mental process. Explaining their behavior by showing how it arose from the 
functional interaction of component parts that are shared by all beings whose problem solving 
occurs as a mental process would answer this second why-question. 
 So, in giving a modular unification explanation, one simultaneously indicates a type, 
indicates that the system in question is a member of that type, and shows how the character of its 
membership in that type (its particular configuration of modules) explains its occurrence. In the 
example from Plato's Republic, Plato introduces a timocracy as a member of the type 'political 
regime.' He establishes that each political regime arises from a different configuration of the 
same three modules, which enables him to explain the timocratic state in terms of its particular 
configuration of modules. In the study from Cummins et al., the relevant type is 'beings whose 
problem solving occurs as a mental process.' The particular pattern of children's performance on 
word problems that the researchers set out to investigate is a member of that type, and the 
simulation is designed to show that the configuration of cognitive modules that the researchers 
believe to be operative for children in their problem-solving attempts explains the observed 
response patterns. The second and third explanatory benefits I will mention here are derived from 
the fact that a modular unification explanation explains the behavior in question as an instance of 
a broader category (a type).  
 The second explanatory benefit is that, because a modular unification explanation 
proceeds by identifying the target system as a member of a type, it provides the resources for a 
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variety of new answers to contrastive why-questions. These contrastive why-questions take the 
form, “why did this system perform the way it did instead of performing in one of the other ways 
it could have performed, given its type?” In the language of modules, the questions take the 
form, “why did this system perform the way it did instead of performing in one of the ways that 
other systems that share its component modules do?” Notice that this second sort of question 
could not even be asked by someone who was not engaged in the task of making sense of 
observable phenomena in terms of the modularity of the systems that give rise to them. One 
would not be able to identify the specified contrast class (the other systems composed of all or 
some of the same modules) without recognizing the shared component modules as a 
scientifically important source of similarity among physical systems. Pursuing the goal of 
explaining systems by modular unification thus makes it possible to both ask and answer new 
contrastive why-questions.  
 When Cummins et al. performed their study, they were responding to researchers who 
hypothesized that the children performed as they did because the functioning of their logico-
mathematical reasoning module was weaker than the functioning of their story-comprehension 
modules. The simulation – and not merely the results of their empirical field study – offers 
insight into why the observed patterns arose, rather than the results that would have arisen from a 
system in which the modules exhibited the comparative functional strengths indicated by the 
rival hypothesis. The simulation can answer this contrastive question because it is able to 
identify what patterns result from a simulation whose modules exhibited those comparative 
strengths. So, by unifying the observed system with other members of its type (systems 
composed of the same modules, but with different functional strengths and weaknesses) the 
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researchers are able to answer additional contrastive why-questions about their target system, and 
therefore provide greater understanding of the target system.  
 Finally, an additional explanatory benefit of modular unification is that having a modular 
unification explanation of a target system enables one to explain the relation that the target 
system bears to other systems that are also members of its type. In the Cummins et al. study, 
unifying children's word-problem-solving behaviors with behaviors observed in adults solving 
chess problems reveals significant similarities and differences between the two systems. For 
instance, someone who sees how the children's word problem solving system is unified with an 
adult chess problem solving system will be able to see the myriad respects in which the former is 
an immature version of the latter. It is no coincidence that certain similarities arise across 
problem-solving phenomena because the systems that give rise to these disparate phenomena 
share component functional parts and therefore share many dependencies and interactions among 
these parts. A modular unification explanation is uniquely well-suited to explain why this is no 
coincidence by illustrating the relationships among the unified systems. Likewise, someone who 
understands a timocracy as unified with the other political regimes identified by Plato will 
understand the respects in which a timocracy is vulnerable to devolving into an oligarchy, as well 
as the respects in which it is an unbalanced alternative to aristocracy. In this way, modular 
unification explanations encompass additional explananda beyond the original explananda they 
are offered in order to explain, and therefore generate greater understanding of modular systems.  
 These explanatory benefits of modular unification explanation all reflect the central 
insight of the unificationist school of thought: by unifying disparate phenomena, more 
understanding is gained through the use of less explanatory apparatus. Modular unification thus 
stands in contrast to other strategies that might be used to explain modular phenomena. For 
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instance, a causal history of a particular timocracy or pattern in children's word problem solving 
would offer one answer to the question of why that particular society or pattern arose, but it 
would require a great deal of information and would not offer any of the additional sources of 
understanding that I have identified in this section. Though such an explanation may be 
appropriate in some scientific contexts, it would fail to provide the critical sources of 
understanding that the corresponding modular unification explanation would provide, and it 
would therefore do less with more.  
 
 5.6 Some Final Clarifications 
 
 It is important to note that one need not be committed to the idea that a modular 
unification explanation is always superior to than another explanation. There are a multitude of 
explanatory virtues, and this category of unifying explanations have some virtues that even the 
most complete causal history wouldn't have (and vice versa), but the sort of explanatory power 
needed in a particular case will be determined in part by context.  
 It is also important to note that the relevant sort of “doing more with less” that occurs in a 
case of modular unification is not merely a pragmatic benefit. One might reasonably surmise 
that, if the same computer program can furnish many scientific explanations, then this is 
preferable simply because it is a more efficient use of resources than creating a simulation that 
has fewer explanatory applications. You get more explanatory bang for your simulation buck if 
you manage to devise a simulation that is applicable across many phenomena, and the fewer 
moving parts, the less programming  labor is required. Surely, such a pragmatic benefit may be a 
virtue of the particular simulation I presented above and of unifying simulations in general. 
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However, I hope to have shown that this is not the only or even the most important advantage of 
employing unifying simulations in scientific research.  
 
6. Computer Simulations and Modular Unification  
 
 Why are computer simulations particularly good at furnishing unifying explanations of 
phenomena? Modular representations are particularly useful for providing unifying simulations 
of systems that presumably have many of the same discrete parts or sub-systems, and computer 
simulations, because programming is often modular, are particularly good at representing 
modular systems. Programmers favor developing modular programs in part because modular 
design is simply a more efficient means of developing high-functioning programs. James 
Gosling, the creator of the Java programming language, has written of the modularity of systems 
that it is favored so heavily by programmers in part because it “helps hugely with evolution and 
debugging, and fault containment, and a host of other issues” (Biancuzzi 2009, p. 284) He writes 
further that: 
...It's proven to be very, very valuable – much more valuable than the kind of 
stuff that people do with spaghetti code, where everything is directly integrated 
with everything else, and if you try to change any one thing, then everything else 
has to change. (p. 284)  
 
It is thus natural that the evolution of computer programming has significantly advanced the 
abilities of scientists to simulate the function of modular systems. 
 Moreover, though we might be able to understand a priori how some modular systems 
(e.g. Plato's five regimes) would behave, we are not by ourselves able to fully work out the 
interactions of modules within systems as complex as the target system in the word problem 
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case. In Plato's simpler case, one may be able to reason through how the various parts of the 
society might influence each other in various configurations, but it is very difficult for even an 
expert to determine without computational assistance what would happen if one were to tweak, 
for example, just the linguistic sophistication and not the mathematical knowledge of a problem-
solving first-grader. It is much easier to do the reasoning of integrating multiple functional units 
operating as parts of a complex whole with a computer program than it is from the armchair or 
even the laboratory.  
 So, as was true of both of the reverse-engineering simulations I characterized in Chapter 
2 and the how-possibly explanation simulations I characterized in Chapter 3, modular unification 
simulations are rightly seen as extensions of our a priori reasoning beyond our cognitive 
limitations. In many cases, scientists have good evidence that a system is composed of a number 
of parts that have complicated functions. Often in such cases, it would be too difficult without 
advanced computational power to determine how these parts interact. A major benefit of 
computational complexity is that it allows researchers to understand the complicated interactions 
among component parts. It is also worth noting that computer programs are particularly likely to 
show us how a system might “do less with more” because they are designed by programmers, 
who have a kind of engineering training, and are therefore trained to see efficient use of 
resources as a virtue of the computational task. For these reasons, computer simulations are 
uniquely well-suited to further our understanding via modular unification.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that an unrecognized value of some computer simulations is 
their ability to furnish what I have called modular unification explanations. On my account, 
modular unification occurs when scientists appeal to the same modest stock of functional 
ingredients operating in concert in order to explain disparate phenomena. To motivate this 
account, I described a research program in behavioral psychology and argued that the 
introduction of the computer simulation to that research project has value in part because of its 
prospects for unifying a complex target system (children's word problem solving) with other 
complex systems of the same type. I also showed that this explanatory virtue is present outside of 
computer simulations as well, but it is much easier to achieve for complex systems with 
advanced computational technology. As advances in computer simulation technology continue to 
be made, there is reason to expect greater and greater explanatory progress through modular 
unification. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
  
 In this thesis, I have argued that there are at least three important functional roles played 
by computer simulations in scientific practice that have not yet been adequately attended to by 
philosophers. Reverse-engineering simulations function to simultaneously generate and confirm 
hypotheses when scientists are at a loss about how to begin investigating a phenomenon of 
interest. How-possibly simulations function to explain how states of affairs are possible by 
correcting for a failure of imagination on the part of the explanation's recipient. Modular 
unification simulations explain why some phenomenon occurs and do so in a way that unifies the 
phenomenon with other phenomena that arise from the same stock of functional components. In 
identifying these three functions of computer simulations, I have begun to illustrate some of the 
respects in which computer simulations are used by scientists to explain, confirm, and discover. I 
expect that further investigations into other cases of computer simulation in scientific practice 
will reveal still more scientific functions of computer simulations. 
 Though these three functions of computer simulations are distinct, a single simulation 
may perform more than one of them. For instance, the very same simulation might 
simultaneously furnish a how-possibly explanation and function as a reverse-engineering 
simulation. In fact, the boids simulation I presented in Chapter 3 appears to serve both of these 
functions. Though Craig Reynolds did not devise this simulation with the aim of uncovering the 
mechanisms that underlie bird flock formations, he nevertheless produced a reverse-engineering 
simulation that, in the hands of ornithologists, performed both the hypothesis generation function 
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and the confirmation function that are characteristic of reverse-engineering simulations. 
Moreover, one can quite easily observe a sensitivity to at least some of the heuristics I identified 
in Chapter 3 in the comments made by ornithologists whose work has been influenced by the 
boids simulation. Perhaps the most notable example is the great extent to which Reynolds' boids 
simulation has been praised by ornithologists for its simplicity.63 
 Furthermore, the boids simulation appears to have some promise at furnishing a modular 
unification explanation as well. Recall that another computer scientist, Gary William Flake, 
managed to successfully adapt Reynolds's boids simulation in order to replicate the “V” 
formations commonly observed in flocks of large migratory birds (1998, p. 271-275). He kept 
Reynolds' original three rules and added one additional rule in order to generate the “V” 
formation in his simulation. These rules are modules. That is, they are distinct, self-contained 
functional units that perform characteristic functions on the basis of inputs. If it turns out that 
both the boids simulation and Flake's modification really do depict the mechanisms that underlie 
flock formations, then these simulations will not only turn out to be explanatory, but they will 
also offer explanations with the myriad explanatory benefits of modular unification that I 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 A second instance of a simulation that was developed to achieve one of these scientific 
functions having the potential to later achieve another of these functions is the ideal adaptive 
agent simulation of learning I discussed in Chapter 2. Recall that one of the scientists developing 
these reverse-engineering simulations envisioned as the long-term goal of the research project 
the creation of a nine-mode simulation of human learning, reflecting the nine learning 
mechanisms postulated by the cognitive scientists involved in this project (Ohlsson 2011, p. 
                                                 
63 For a representative discussion, see Bajec and Heppner (2009).  
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204). If these scientists succeed in developing a successful nine-mode simulation, it will likely 
exhibit the explanatory virtue of modular unification. Ohlsson predicts that these nine functional 
units will show up in explanations of learning behaviors of all kinds, so a simulation that 
incorporates them will, if his predictions are borne out, be suitable to explain many observable 
trends in human learning (with the strength and content of its modules tweaked to fit the various 
target systems). If this model is able to employ the same stock of nine functional ingredients 
operating in concert to explain a variety of trends in human learning across subject and task 
populations, it will thereby promote greater understanding of human learning via modular 
unification.  
 So, it seems that both the boids simulation and the ideal adaptive agent simulation have 
the potential to perform explanatory roles, hypothesis-generation roles, and confirmatory roles 
within their respective research programs. This raises some interesting questions for future 
research: are there features of some simulations that make them particularly fruitful in this way? 
If so, are these features that computer simulations are particularly apt to achieve? Is it just a 
coincidence that some simple simulations (such as the boids simulation and the ideal adaptive 
agent simulation) are especially well-suited to carry out so many scientific functions? Should 
scientists seeking to fulfill one of the functions I have mentioned via simulation attempt to 
design their simulations with an eye toward performing other functions as well? Under what 
circumstances would these goals be congruent, and under what circumstances would they be in 
tension?  
 In addition to questions about functional versatility, this thesis brings out interesting 
issues about the role of engineering principles in the methodology of science. The computer 
simulations discussed in this thesis perform their scientific functions as well as they do in part 
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because they are well-engineered by the programmers who devise them. The methodology of 
programming has its own principles and best practices, including principles from engineering 
generally. For example, as I noted in Chapter 4, modularity is widely considered by computer 
engineers to be a feature of superior program design.64 As I have shown, in some cases, a 
computer simulation is able to offer a host of scientifically explanatory benefits as a result of 
being modular. Do the principles that are employed by programmers to achieve simulations 
capable of fulfilling the roles I've identified in this thesis therefore count as principles of good 
scientific reasoning? 
 I claimed in Chapter 1 that all of the scientific functions I explore in this thesis can in 
principle be performed by means other than computer simulations. To substantiate that claim, I 
have offered non-computational cases of reverse-engineering, how-possibly explanation, and 
modular unification, alongside my case studies of computer simulations that perform these three 
functions. However, I also claimed that, in point of fact, computers are indispensable to many 
contemporary research programs. This is because the representational power of digital computers 
is unrivaled by that of any other tool at the disposal of scientists today. As I have demonstrated 
through my engagement with the three central case studies of this thesis, scientists' access to 
computers allows them to extend their a priori reasoning beyond human cognitive limitations. In 
my final remarks, I would like to say a bit more about the extension of a priori reasoning that 
computers enable.  
 Consider once more the boids simulation. When Reynolds devised and programmed his 
three simple rules, he enabled ornithologists to recognize the possibility of leaderless flocking, a 
possibility that they had previously dismissed because they had not yet found a way to fully 
                                                 
64 See again James Gosling's description of the value of modularity in Biancuzzi 2009.  
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represent that possibility through unaided imagination. Reynolds presented them with a 
strikingly realistic rendering of bird movement and knowledge about how the simulation was 
built. Once they understood the three rules whose interactions gave rise to a visual representation 
that so closely resembled the movements of real flocks of birds, they could see how it was 
possible for birds to flock without a leader.   
 Strictly speaking, the how-possibly explanation furnished by the boids simulation could 
have been given without the use of a computer program, but it would have required a massive 
amount of human labor and ingenuity. Without computational aid, researchers could have 
devised formal rules like the ones proposed by Reynolds and calculated on their own the 
positions of individual boids in a cluster formation over a series of instances. They could have 
even represented these movements in some way that captured their fluidity and resemblance to 
real bird flocks without a computer program – perhaps with a flip-book of positional diagrams, 
for instance. But it would be exceedingly difficult to manipulate such a representation in the 
variety of ways that Reynolds' simulation can be manipulated. By turning individual rules on and 
off and observing what happens, programmers can reveal the contributions of the individual 
rules. By adding obstacles and changing various other parameters of the simulation environment 
to reflect diverse environmental factors that affect the flocking of real birds, programmers can 
reveal the robustness of the boids' resemblance to real bird flocks. None of these interventions 
are in principle off limits without computer simulations, but the amount of time, effort, skill, and 
other resources required by this sort of enterprise would be staggering. So when I say that 
computer simulations enable us to extend our a priori reasoning beyond our cognitive limitations, 
I am including among those limitations things like the amount of time it takes us to perform 
calculations, our limited attention spans, and our limited abilities to imagine things unaided.  
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 I have established in this thesis that computer simulations are of tremendous scientific 
value. In particular, I have identified three functions commonly performed by computer 
simulations that have their value in part because they involve extensions of our a priori 
reasoning. While these functions can be and have been performed without computer simulation 
technology, I have shown why computer simulations are vastly superior to other means available 
for achieving scientists' representational aims in many contemporary research projects. Because 
the demands of achieving these functions for complex systems without the aid of computers are 
often prohibitive, these functions played a smaller overall role in the pre-digital scientific age 
than they do today. It is therefore understandable that these functions have been historically 
overlooked by philosophers of science. 
 Because philosophers of science had not yet adequately attended to these important 
scientific functions, in order to answer the question of why computer simulations are of such 
great value, I needed to first provide accounts of the scientific functions they perform that 
demonstrate why they amount to good scientific reasoning. So, in my exploration of the 
scientific value of computer simulations, I offered three rational reconstructions of methods of 
coming to understand the natural world that are familiar to scientists, but little discussed by 
philosophers.  
 In Chapter 2, I argued for an account of why reverse-engineering is a scientifically 
valuable practice. My account answers the question of what makes one successful reverse-
engineering attempts more evidentially powerful than another, and therefore provides some 
resources for scientists attempting to discern whether a particular reverse-engineering endeavor 
has the potential to be worthwhile. Moreover, in developing my account of the function of 
reverse-engineering simulations, I offered a picture that challenges the distinction between the 
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context of discovery and the context of justification. My account weighs against the idea that the 
discovery of scientific hypotheses is an arational enterprise that is not governed by norms of 
good practice. In Chapter 3, I argued for an account of how-possibly explanations. It was central 
to my account that how-possibly explanations are given in the face of an inability to imagine 
how some state of affairs is possible. Therefore an important and often overlooked feature of 
how-possibly explanations is their success at relieving imaginative frustration. In Chapter 4, I 
identified a novel explanatory virtue called modular unification that occurs when scientists are 
able to appeal to a modest stock of functional ingredients operating in concert in order to explain 
disparate phenomena. I demonstrated that modular unification can result in greater explanatory 
power by promoting understanding of target systems in a number of ways.  
 The rational reconstructions I have offered apply equally well to computational and non-
computational instances of these three functions. My thesis has thus served the dual aims of 
advancing understanding of scientific reasoning generally and of advancing understanding of 
how computer simulations in particular have changed the face of the scientific method in the 
digital age.  
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